The depth of winter found General John A. Logan's com

mand stretched along the railroad between Stevenson and Decatur,

part of Hurlbut's along the Nashville and Decatur road, the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps along the road from Nashville to Chattanooga, the Fourteenth at Chattanooga, Granger's force between Cleveland and Knoxville. Sherman was sent to Memphis and Vicksburg in person to superintend the disposition and movement of forces so as to prevent a winter invasion of Mississippi. McPherson, at Vicksburg, was notified of this, and ordered to dispatch a cavalry force through the State to clean out Forrest, who was, with detached bands of troops, harrassing smaller towns therein and in Western Tennessee. This was the cavalry part of what afterward became the celebrated Meridian raid.

On January 13th, 1864, Grant returned from Knoxville by way of Cumberland Gap and Lexington to Nashville, where he made his headquarters. This journey made in mid-winter was full of hardship and danger. The mountains were covered with ice and snow and the thermometer was ten degrees below zero. In many places it was impossible to ride, and Grant and his party were compelled to dismount and lead their horses. The general in advance had many falls, but suffered no material injury. A few days after his arrival at Nashville, he was suddenly called to St. Louis by the dangerous illness of one of his children. Hurrying through the country in the modest dress of a citizen, he studiously avoided all public ovation and display, and as soon as the danger which threatened his son had passed returned in the same way to his headquarters.

On the 15th he dispatched to Halleck that Sherman would be ready to start from Vicksburg by the 24th with a force of twenty thousand men to destroy all the railroads in Northern Mississippi "so effectually that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them again during the rebellion. He will then return unless opportunity of going into Mobile with the force he has appears perfectly plain." It seems that Grant could not give up the idea of capturing Mobile, much less letting the enemy rest in parts where winter operations were possible.

By this time he had so far matured his plans for a spring campaign as to present them to the authorities at Washington, which he did on January 15th, and in the letter just quoted from he said: "I look upon the next line for me to secure, to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile; Montgomery and Atlanta being the important intermediate points. To do this, large supplies must be secured on the Tennessee river, so as to be independent of the railroad from here (Nashville) to the Tennessee for a considerable length of time. Mobile would be a second base. The destruction which Sherman will do to the roads around Meridian will be of material importance to us in preventing the enemy from drawing supplies from the Mississippi, and in clearing that section of all large bodies of rebel troops. I do not look upon any points, except Mobile in the south and the Tennessee river in the north, as presenting practicable starting points from which to operate against Atlanta and Montgomery."

In the discussion over the features of these plans which was held between Grant and the authorities at Washington, he clearly foreshadowed that grand movement under Sherman which had Atlanta for its base and which ended in the historic "march to the sea." To all doubts about the ability of his generals to take charge of and carry to success an independent movement of the magnitude contemplated, he repeatedly insisted that both Sherman and McPherson were officers of

such experience and reliability as to be confidently trusted with separate and distant commands for any purpose.

By February 1st, 1864, Sherman was on the move from Vicksburg with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under Hurlbut, two of the Seventeenth under McPherson and a brigade of cavalry under Colonel Winslow. Smith, Grant's chief of cavalry, swept out from Memphis with a large force, and with orders to join Sherman at Meridian. These columns moved invincibly forward, although confronted by Loring, French and S. D. Lee, with a considerable strength of infantry and cavalry. On February 4th, Sherman entered Jackson, and on the next day crossed the Pearl river. Thence he marched rapidly on Meridian, pausing only to build bridges and destroy railroads. On February 14th, he entered Meridian, the Confederate forces under Polk having evacuated the place without offering serious opposition. From this point he spread railroad destruction in every direction, and burned all storehouses and supplies. The Confederates were reinforced and returned to attack him. Sherman gathered in his forces, and a Smith had not yet put in an appearance with his eight thousand cavalry, he resolved to not risk a battle, but to retreat. On the 20th, McPherson started back to Jackson, and the rest of the force made a detour with the hope of meeting Smith. Failing in this, it concentrated at Canton, where word came that Smith had gotten no further than West Point, whence he had been forced to retreat by Forrest's cavalry. Thus what Grant at first thought might prove a move which would end in the capture of Mobile, turned out to be only a magnificent raid. But it was not without its value, both in the crippling of the enemy by the destruction of railroads and suplies, and in proving that vigilance must not yet be relaxed even in sections which were thought comparatively safe. Its moral effect on the Confederates was great. Never before had a Federal army penetrated so far into the Confederacy;

immense excitement prevailed everywhere.

Farragut was

making a naval demonstration against the forts of Mobile, and it was feared that Sherman was bound directly for the place to make a land attack. Reinforcements were hurried to Polk from Mobile and from Johnston's (Johnston had succeeded Hardee) army in front of Thomas. But Sherman was without a supply line, and a long way from any permanent base, and he retreated as above seen.

In

This ended Grant's immediate supervision of the armies in the southwest. But he was all the time busy at Nashville. He had urged Schofield, who had succeeded Foster at Knoxville, to prepare for a movement on Longstreet. That officer had talked the whole matter over with Foster, and their opinion was that Longstreet could not be successfully disturbed before spring. this joint judgment of two very able and trusty officers Grant finally acquiesced. Thomas was, however, ordered to make a demonstration against Johnston at Dalton, so as to keep him from sending reinforcements to any army that might be opposing Sherman's southern movement. He moved from Chattanooga with a strong force and penetrated as far as Dalton, but found the roads in fearful condition, and all the strong points well guarded by the enemy. Nothing could be done but leave an advance posted well toward Dalton and wait the building of the railroad and the return of spring.

GEN. SCHOFIELD.

The campaigns of the West and Southwest in the year 1863, had been very remarkable. Wherever they had been conducted on the principle of separate and selfish action they were fatal. Wherever they had been conducted on the prin