first rescued and reorganized and reinforced before it could rescue itself, and above all, effect the rescue of Burnside at Knoxville. We have seen how General Grant went about his work of rescue; how he opened the Tennessee below and established communications with Nashville; how he urged and helped Sherman in his long weary march; how he looked up every strategic point in and about Chattanooga; how he concentrated and manoeuvred for positions; how he ordered and fought, first with Hooker for the enemy's left on the heights of Lookout, then with Sherman for the enemy's right on Missionary Ridge, and again at an opportune moment, and when the menace was complete on both wings, how he let loose his invincible centre under Thomas, scaled the entrenched heights, and broke the enemy in twain. Notwithstanding obstacles of march, river crossing, abrupt mountain side, heavy and frequent entrenchment, uncertainty of skirmish and charge, every movement was ordered with intelligence and made with promptitude and precision. No corps, division nor brigade was out of time. No vital object failed. Every subordinate excelled in rare good management of his men; and the courage, endurance and enthusiasm of the men were without parallel. It was a battle of monumental plans and grand executions. Vicksburg had been all preliminary strategy and then pertinacious stick. Shiloh had been stubborn, close fighting. Chattanooga was giant manœuvre in sight of a fortified enemy, a complete outwitting of his keenest suspicions, a herculean move, involving the finest co-operations on the part of lieutenants and bravest efforts of a gallant soldiery. It was two grand battles in one, for it meant not only the defeat of Bragg on the hill tops around Chattanooga and the driving of him back to where the waters run toward the gulf, but the relief of Burnside, at Knoxville, and the Federal control of East Tennessee.. And it was equally extraordinary in other respects. The results were of great permanent value. This was a characteristic of all Grant's battles. He made his victories tell. He organized and fought for results. The results of Chattanooga were acquisition of vast territory, a way to Atlanta and the heart of the Confederacy, and finally through that heart to the sea, the erection of a fortified menace on the very spot which had for years been a threat to the North. The result to the country was the lifting of the terrible Chickamauga cloud and a bursting in of sunlight upon a situation which had been dark and a source of the gloomiest foreboding. Its effects on the armies were remarkable. Three separate hosts had for the first time fought together under a single and trusted commander. The Potomac, the Cumberland, the Mississippi, had blended their chivalry to win combined honors. The Potomac, under Hooker, had fought the enemy's left off Lookout and Missionary Ridge. The Mississippi, under Sherman, had fought the enemy's right up the Missionary foothills. The Cumberland, under Thomas, had scaled the heights of the centre and broken the enemy into fragments. United they were invincible, but the union must be just such as Chat'anooga showed to be possible, a union of force, discipline, heart, under a genius in whom confidence was boundless, and a spirit that was all presiding. The experiment of uniting departments and armies under one master mind had met with the endorsement of a magnificent, timely and most fruitful victory, and the destiny of the calm, determined, yet anxious and brilliant, leader was further foreshadowed. It remained for the authorities to act upon the proofs which Chattanooga sup plied, both as to the wisdom of and necessity for a central and supreme commandership. Happily circumstances were rapidly shaping to that end, and none more powerfully than the exist ence of one whose deeds declared him worthy the high distinc tion and equal to the great responsibility. The following shows the organization of the contending armies at Chattanooga : Commanding United States Forces.-MAJOR GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRant. Army of the Cumberland.-Commander, MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS, Part of Army of the Tennessee.—Commander, MAJOR GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN. Fifteenth Corps, 1st Div.-Brig. Gen. P. J. Osterhaus, Confederate Army.-Commander, GENERAL BRAXTON Bragg, CHAPTER XI. WE CHATTANOOGA TO WASHINGTON. E have had a glimpse of the bearing of the battle of Chattanooga on the fortunes of Burnside's army in East Tennessee. Let us take a hasty view of the situation there. Early in November, 1863, Bragg, feeling all too sure of his positions around Chattanooga, and that time only was required to force the Federals into retreat or capitulation, dispatched Longstreet with a large and excellent corps to operate against Burnside, who was at Knoxville, and had pushed a strong advance of twelve thousand men down along the railroad to the Holsten river, across which a pontoon bridge had been built. It was here that Longstreet first met him. Burnside's policy, as has been seen in the previous chapter, was not to fight, but to keep up shows of battle, in order to risk nothing on his part, and at the same time draw Longstreet so far away from Bragg, at Chattanooga, as to put mutual reinforcement out of the question, should the fate of Chattanooga require it. And then, if Grant should be successful there, and should drive Bragg southward, Longstreet could be marched upon from the rear and forced into the devious by-ways of the mountains, perhaps captured. This was Grant's plan, and Burnside was to second it by his shows of battle and retreats. He therefore burned his bridge across the Holsten, on the approach of Longstreet, prepared for battle on the north side. of the river, and after administering a severe check, fell back to Campbell's Station, where he again made a stubborn stand. His next retreat was to Knoxville, which was well fortified, though but poorly provisioned. This he intended to hold as long as possible, in expectation of hearing from Grant and finding succor through and by means of a decisive turn of affairs at Chattanooga. Longstreet tried the defences of Knoxville, on November 18th, but finding them too strong for direct capture, he invested the place, determined to starve Burnside out. He was reinforced by several small commands from Virginia, and began to manœuvre so as to cut off all sources of Federal supply. In this he was confidently engaged when he was startled by the defeat of Bragg, at Chattanooga. He knew what this meant. It made every moment precious to him. He determined on an assault before Grant could send relief. On November 29th, he threw three brigades of McLaw's division, with murderous energy, on Fort Sanders, near the northwest angle of Burnside's works, supporting them with the rest of his force. The ditches were reached and rapidly filled by the assaulting forces. But a merciless fire of canister was opened on them from the salients, and they were mowed down ere they could scale the parapet. Again and again they were repulsed, and finally broke in confusion, some preferring surrender to retreat back over ground subjected to so hot a fire. This rash experiment cost Longstreet a thousand men in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Federal loss was only thirteen. Just then Longstreet received word from President Davis that Bragg had been defeated by Grant' at Chattanooga, and that he should hasten to his succor. He started, but hearing that the Federal troops were already at Cleveland, on the line of the railroad, and knowing that he could not hope to reach Bragg, he wisely returned to the siege of Knoxville, trusting thus to divert Grant from pursuit of Bragg. Immediately after the victory at Chattanooga, Grant ordered Granger's Fourth Corps to march rapidly to the relief of Knoxville. But that general delayed, and Sherman, who had been |