rest had been driven clear off the scene of effective action. This was a source of humiliation, a blow at the spirit of the Confederacy, a cause of gloomy doubts, a rude awakening to the possibility of never realizing by force of arms the success

of secession and separate empire. In a single campaign that army had suffered five defeats outside of Vicksburg, had been severed and its greater part captured within the defences, had been driven from Jackson, had lost forty thousand prisoners, twelve thousand killed and wounded, and thousands of stragglers, in all fully sixty thousand men, with arms and munitions for one hundred thousand effectives.

The result to the army of the West was as it a great load

had been lifted. It was exhilarated and nerved for new conquests. Its trials had brought it unmatched discipline, its victories rendered it invincible. Henceforth it would move in any direction with the willingness of a veteran band and the certainty of triumph. Its least excited, most unperturbed and modest spirit was its great leader, who asked nothing for himself, claimed nothing except through the gallant officers and privates who had so cheerfully and obediently followed him through the valleys of trial and up to the summits of victory. He congratulated all on their devotion and bravery, and Sherman, McPherson and all his faithful officers were remembered with hearty recommendations for honor and promotion.

The effect of Vicksburg on the armies of the East was inspiring. They had for a long time been worried by changes of commanders, by General Lee's tactical marches and sudden onsets, and had at last been forced to concentrate, not in time to prevent, but in order to meet, a bold and desperate attempt on the part of that renowned leader to march into the North and pierce its very vitals. While Grant was investing Vicksburg, all the northeastern States were quaking and all the Federal armies therein were seemingly overmatched. It seemed to require such a move as that of General Lee, above the Potomac and into Pennsylvania, to establish unanimity, awaken co-operation, and force a clear perception of danger. Lee forced Gettysburg on the Federal armies of the East, just as Grant forced Vicksburg on the Confederate armies of the West; not, to be sure, with the same victorious preludes, but with the same originality of conception and tactical desperation. The results were wholly different. Grant kept Pemberton and Johnston separated. It was genius against genius and physical force against physical force. Lee could not keep his opposition divided, for the division had been simply in its councils, a matter of feeling, moral, rather than physical division. A common danger, a patriotic awakening, a firm

united resolve, a commander whose power to command was greater than his individual sentiments, his speculative fervor, his love of self, and there would come about a result which not even the energy and genius of a Lee could contravene. Gettysburg was this result. It was a clash of two great armies, equal in strength and on a fair field. and resource for three whole days.

ranks, and died or were wounded in

It was a test of valor Men stood firm in both

nearly equal numbers.

It was a brave fight in which Meade and Lee, and all the

officers and men on both sides,

as the reader may choose to view them, won glory. But even on the night of July 3d, 1863, it was nobody's victory, nor yet on the morning of the 4th. Not until the confession made by Lee's retreat was wafted back to the Federal front, and passed thence from corps to corps and camp to camp, did the Federal army realize that it was triumphant,

GEN. MEADE.

and the nation that it had cause for congratulation more inspiring than its memories of a natal day. And even yet that tired and worn-out army, too stricken to give successful pur suit, too sad to jubilate with its home friends, was not assured of the magnitude of its blow or the real wealth of its conquest, till its heart was electrified by the news that Vicksburg too had fallen and the stars and stripes were waving in triumph on its ramparts. The thrill of subdued delight then became one of unrestrained joy, and every Federal soldier felt that even if Lee had not been crushed, he must go back to a country bowed in despair, and henceforth support a cause whose life was rapidly oozing.

Who can imagine the effect of Vicksburg and Gettysburg combined on the country? It was as if a dumb mouth had suddenly opened and proclaimed its joy on the housetops. It was as if a deeply sunken heart had in a moment leaped into glowing action. It was as if a lowering cloud, impervious to all radiance, had been whisked away by glad breezes, and a full flow of hope's brightest sunlight had come upon the people. A loud, prolonged, united, Amen! sealed the country's prayers for deliverance, its heartfelt words of approval, its speeches and songs and acts of jubilation. The drift of a cause was changed. Destiny took new shape. The United States were not to be divided States. Amid the unbounded joy of the people and the supreme satisfaction of the Government, General Grant became the recipient of unstinted praise and a central figure in our military history. He was hailed with unfeigned delight and sincerity as "the only general who was always successful." President Lincoln wrote him on July 13th, after the full effects of his victory became known, "I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. . . . When you got below Vicksburg and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong;" and Halleck, who had all along disapproved of the campaign,

wrote:

"Your report dated July 6th, of your Mississippi campaign, ending in the capitulation of Vicksburg was received last evening. Your narration of the campaign, like the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly and in every respect creditable and satisfactory. In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon at Ulm. You and your