His efforts were in the nature of a series of surprises. He never remitted pursuit, and made the object of the expedition speedily secure. The battle was a sharp contention, in which Grant had the advantage of numbers. His loss was one hundred and thirty killed and seven hundred and eighteen wounded. He estimated the enemy's loss in killed and wounded as equal to his own, with the addition of six hundred and fifty prisoners, and the capture of six field pieces. In their hasty evacuation of Grand Gulf the Confederates left behind thirteen heavy guns.

Now that the Federal foothold was firm, General Grant sent orders to Sherman to push his corps down and across the Mississippi to his aid. He immediately disposed of the forces then with him so as to cover the country in his rear and make active demonstration on the enemy at the Black river crossings and at Jackson. The officers were now confident, the troops hardy and elated, so that there was no fear of lack of vigor. Word had been received below from Banks, that he could not be expected to reach the scene till after the fall of Port Hudson. This determined Grant to go on with the investment of Vicksburg alone. He had heard from Grierson's Cavalry raid, and knew that it was possible to live, for a time at least, off the enemy's country. He was therefore less anxious about supplies, although an ample store had been ordered to Grand Gulf.

General Pemberton had command at Vicksburg, under General Joseph E. Johnston, who commanded the Department. Johnston was concentrating rapidly at Jackson, fifty miles to the rear of Vicksburg. Grant had pushed the bulk of his army up toward Raymond, in the direction of Jackson, and had possession of Clinton, on the railroad between Vicksburg and Jackson. His object was to keep himself as much as possible between Johnston's and Pemberton's forces, so as to prevent their union and if possible attack them separately.

But he was thus exposing his communications with Grand Gulf. Johnston saw this, and ordered Pemberton to attack Grant's rear at Clinton. But Pemberton swung toward Raymond, designing to make his blow more effective. His misfortune was that Grant had resolved as early as May 11th to cut loose from his base at Grand Gulf. He was now, May 14th, marching his men with only three days' rations in their haversacks, and with orders to live as much as possible on the country.

After a spirited fight at Raymond, Sherman was ordered to take the direct road to Jackson, and McPherson to take a northerly and parallel road. McClernand was to hold a point near Raymond, in supporting distance of both. On the morning of the 14th Grant wrote Halleck: "I will attack the State Capitol to-day." It was the point toward which Johnston was rapidly hurrying his reinforcements from the south. If struck quickly it would prove a masterly blow.

Sherman and McPherson moved so simultaneously that they reached the place at the same hour. The Confederate outposts were driven in, and guns were put in position to reply to the fire to which the Federals were now subjected. A rain set in which suspended the attack for two hours, but the time was well occupied in getting troops into position. Then McPherson ordered an advance, which soon became a gallant charge by Crocker's division. It swept the Confeder ates from their outer posts, and drove them behind their permanent works. Both McPherson and Sherman now drew their lines closer, brought their artillery to bear, and began a resolute attack on the defensive works. Grant, who had all the while been with Sherman, ordered that officer to send a force to the extreme right, as far as Pearl river. It did not return, and Grant rode to the right himself, accompanied only by his staff. He found the road open clear to Jackson. The enemy had hastily evacuated before it received the force of

the designed blow. Grant, in company with a dozen officers, rode forward and entered the works and the city. His son, a lad of thirteen, who had accompanied his father throughout the campaign, spurred his horse ahead of the company and was really the first to enter the Capitol of Mississippi. By three o'clock in the afternoon both Sherman's and McPherson's corps were in the city and the possession was complete.

The rapidity of Grant's march from Raymond had disconcerted all of Johnston's plans. He was unable to hold on till properly reinforced. The same rapidity carried the Federal army away from danger of a rear attack by Pemberton. The vigor of McPherson's onset had been such that Johnston was unable to save his artillery, and he lost seventeen pieces with nearly a thousand men killed, wounded and prisoners.

The Federal loss was thirty-seven killed and two hundred and twenty-eight wounded. Johnston fell back northward, thus making the gap between him and Pemberton wider.

When Pemberton found that Grant was already beyond Clinton, and as far as Jackson, and further, on the line of direct road from Jackson to Vicksburg, he saw that his swing away from his base on that road at Edward's Station was but to give Grant a fair chance to move directly on Vicksburg. So he made all haste to re-occupy the line of the road again, which he did, selecting a naturally strong position at Champion Hills, nearly midway between Edward's Station and Clinton. Grant knew that it was now possible for Johnston to reinforce Pemberton. So he ordered all his forces to concentrate at Bolton Station, immediately in front of Pemberton's lines at Champion Hills. Battle must be given there and given quickly, before Johnston could recover from the effects of his retreat from Jackson and come to Pemberton's support.

On May 16th, the two armies met, and the battle became hot and stubborn all along the lines, but especially on the Federal left. On the right, Logan carried his division well