The several states, formerly independent, and subsequently absorbed by the Burman empire, forming its northern and north-western frontiers, are calculated to supply a strong geographical boundary between the British and Burmese territories. To detach these states from their connexion with Ava, would be attended with less violence than any of the territorial arrangements consequent upon our successes in Hindostan. The inhabitants are discriminated from the proper Burmese by language and character, as well as by hostile sentiments; and the court of Ava could feel least of all the loss of possessions which it holds by a de facto title only; the right vesting in the original possessors. These petty states might be erected into independent príncipalities; or, which would perhaps be more advantageous for the natives, annexed at once to the presidency of Fort William. In respect to commerce in general, its interests would be materially promoted by the Burmese being deprived of the sea-coasts of ancient Pegu (in which the port of Rangoon is included), Martaban, and Tenasserim; all of which have been wrested, by the insatiable ambition of the rulers of Ava, either from Siam (as in the case of the latter province), or from independent princes. The anti-mercantile policy of the Burmese government demands some check. Not content with the bare possession of Martaban, which was once the capital of a kingdom, and a place of considerable trade, the barbarian conquerors destroyed its port by sinking vessels filled with stones at the mouth of the harbour, so that large vessels cannot enter. The ports of Tavoy and Mergui* have also seriously declined since their conquest by the Burmese. The judicious and politic appropriation of the conquered territory on the eastern coast of the bay of Bengal would strengthen our own power, restrain the ambition of the Burmese, conciliate friendly states, and benefit the general interests of commerce. These speculations may be by some pronounced extravagant and premature; our object, in introducing the remarks which led to them, was, to vindicate the principle of retaining or appropriating a portion of the territory conquered from the enemy by the British arms, the progress of which we now proceed to detail. Our last article closed with the desperate attacks of Bundoolah, and the total defeat of the enemy at Corkain (or Cambah), on the 15th December 1824, From this period till the month of February, the only operation of the Rangoon army was the assault and capture of the stockade and pagoda of Syriam, by Lieut. Col. Elrington, on the 11th January. The Lieut. Colonel, with 200 men of H.M.'s 47th Regt., and a detachment of seamen and marines in the King's and Company's services, carried the fort, which was strong, by storm. Meanwhile, the operations in Assam were closed by the surrender of Rungpore, the capital, and the evacuation of the province by the Burmese troops, by convention with Lieut. Col. Richards, the commander of the British force. This event was preceded by sundry actions between detachments of the army and the Burmese, in which the latter were invariably defeated. Capt. Martin, on the 10th January, captured the stockade of Deorgong; and that of Moora Mookh was taken by surprise, on the 13th, by Lieut. Walden. On the 27th, the advanced position of Col, Richards' force, under Capt. Macleod, at Namdong Nullah, was attacked by the enemy in considerable numbers: Col. Richards, on joining the detachment, directed the enemy's position to be charged; the This port is accessible at all seasons, and is said to be the only safe and convenient harbour on the whole eastern coast of the bay of Bengal. the Burmese fled after the first fire, but were overtaken, and lost 100 men killed, besides three phokuns or chiefs: our loss was trifling. On the 29th, Col. Richards advanced across a jungly country towards Rungpore; on the road he was obstructed by a strong stockade, in which the enemy was entrenched, whose first discharge brought down more than half of the leading division, which created a momentary check. The stockade was, however, assaulted in the most gallant style by Capt. Macleod, with detachments from the 57th and 46th regiments; and the Burmese fled as soon as the troops began to scale. The enemy this day suffered a loss of 100 men. Preparations were now made for the attack of the fort of Rungpore, which was strong and extensive, containing 300 pieces of ordnance, and garrisoned by 10,000 men; but on the 30th, a flag of truce was brought to the camp by a native of Ceylon (a raj gooroo, or Burmese chief-priest), deputed by the phokuns in the city to negociate with the British commander. An armistice took place, and, after a short intercourse between the parties, a treaty was agreed upon, by which the fort was delivered up, with the arms and warlike stores of all descriptions; and the Burmese troops evacuated the territory of Assam. An unsuccessful attempt was made on the 29th January upon the island of Ramree, by part of the force under the command of Lieut. Col. Hampton at Cheduba, aided by the marine force under Capt. Hardy, of the H.C.'s frigate Hastings. The attempt failed through the treachery of the guides employed to lead the column of attack. Our loss was six killed and twenty-two wounded. To repair the disasters sustained in the neighbourhood of Rangoon, the court of Ava re-assembled another powerful army, under its generalissimo, Maha Bundoolah; who announced the fact indirectly to Sir A. Campbell, in a letter addressed to certain residents at Rangoon, the ostensible object of which was, to inquire the reason why the Burmese territories were invaded by the British troops! Previous to the commencement of the campaign, Lieut. Col. Godwin was sent with a body of troops to take possession of the enemy's works at Tantabain, or Quangalle. He reached them on the 6th February. The enemy's position was imposing; situated upon a peninsula, strongly stockaded and abbatised down to the bank of the river, but open in the rear. The broadside of the Satellite armed vessel, and the rockets thrown by the Bengal corps from on board the steam-vessel employed to tow her, created surprise and consternation amongst the Burmese; and in ten minutes after the signal of attack was made, the place was stormed and taken, together with thirty-four pieces of cannon. The enemy suffered severely; our loss was comparatively nothing. A few days after this affair the army advanced from Rangoon in several columns, a proclamation having been previously issued by the commander of the forces, addressed " to the inhabitants of the Burmese empire," explaining the causes of the invasion of their country (of which the Bundoolah professed be ignorant), and promising to spare and to protect the peaceable natives. The land force, under Sir A. Campbell's immediate command, proceeded in the direction of Prome; the marine column, under Brig. Gen. Cotton, advanced towards Panlang and Donabew. The latter portion of the force embarked on the 16th February, and, after destroying some stockades on the river, reached Panlang on the 18th. Upon reconnoitring next day, it was found, that besides the principal stockade, which was very extensive and wellbuilt, D 2 built, subordinate works had been constructed at Youtheet and Mighee, on each side of the river. Preparations were accordingly made for a very serious resistance; but the enemy (whose numbers were between 4,000 and 5,000 men) deserted all the works successively, as soon as the troops advanced to storm. On the 25th the flotilla proceeded up a branch of the Irrawuddy towards Donabew. The enemy was first encountered on the 28th at Youngyoun, on the left bank of the river; this appeared to be an outpost of Donabew. Several skirmishes took place between the flotilla and the Burmese warboats; owing to which, and to the difficulty of getting the heavy vessels over the shallows and bar, the British troops did not reach their position before Donabew till the 6th of March. Its defences consisted of a succession of formidable stockades, commencing at a pagoda some distance from the principal fort, and increasing in strength until completed by the main work, which was seated upon a commanding site, surrounded by deep abbatis, with all the customary defences. The artillery was numerous; the garrison was estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000 men (of whom 10,000 were musqueteers), commanded by Bundoolah in person. A summons to surrender was refused in civil terms; and at sunrise on the 7th an attack was made on the pagoda stockade, by two columns of 250 men each, under Lieut. Col. O'Donaghue and Major Basden. The enemy, whose fire was heavy and well-directed, behaved with great spirit; the stockade, however, was carried; the Burmese lost 450 men, of which number 280 were prisoners: our loss was about twenty killed and wounded. A force of 200 men, under Capt. Rose, then advanced, in two parties, to storm the second stockade, about 500 yards from the first; but the destructive fire from the face of the work caused the columns to diverge from the point of attack, and get into a ditch filled with spikes, and exposed to the enemy's fire, whereby Capts. Rose and Cannon were killed, and a heavy loss was sustained. The storming party retired; and as Gen. Cotton deemed it imprudent to renew his attacks upon a place of such unlooked-for strength, with his small force (only 600 bayonets), he re-embarked on the 8th without any description of loss, and waited at Youngyóun for a reinforcement from Gen. Campbell. Sir Archibald had, in the mean time, prosecuted his march, without interruption, to Sarrawah, where he heard the cannonade at Donabew, which he concluded had fallen, and continued his advance to U-andeet, twenty-six miles farther, where he arrived on the 16th, with every prospect of speedily reaching Prome. Learning, however, the state of affairs at Donabew, he determined immediately to retrograde, and assist in the reduction of that place, the key of his future operations, and commanding the river by which his supplies were received. The passage of the Irrawuddy, and the march from its west bank to Donabew, were attended with great toil and difficulty; and sixteen days elapsed before the two corps were in communication. Whilst employed in preparations for reducing Donabew, the army was joined by the detachment under Major Sale, which had succeeded in expelling the enemy from Bassein, the only maritime possession remaining to the Burmese from Cape Negrais to Tenasserim. The enemy set fire to the town and destroyed it. Gen. Campbell, judging it advisable to attack the fort systematically, had begun (April 2d) to open his batteries of heavy guns and mortars, when the enemy evacuated the place, leaving behind dépôts of grain sufficient for several months' consumption, besides 140 pieces of ordnance, and 269 jingals. During the siege several bold and desperate sallies were made from the fort, though uniformly repulsed; in one of which seventeen elephants, each carry ing a complement of armed men, and supported by a column of infantry, were charged by the body-guard, under Capt. Sneyd, and driven back into the fort, with great loss. A more important event attending this siege, and to which may be ascribed its sudden and unexpected termination, was the death of Bundoolah, who was killed by a rocket or shell from the British batteries on the 1st April. After the reduction of Donabew, Sir A. Campbell resumed his march to Prome. He arrived on the 24th within eight miles of the city, when the enemy retired in the greatest confusion, and the British troops took possession of it without firing a shot. They found there about 100 pieces of artil lery, and extensive well-filled granaries, which had probably been devoted to destruction, as the town was on fire when the British entered, and much grain was, in fact, consumed in one quarter, which was reduced to ashes. The place was well adapted for defence. The stockade was complete, and surpassed, in materials as well as workmanship, all which had been hitherto seen in the country. Most of the surrounding hills were fortified to the very summits, commanding the approach, and presenting a position naturally strong, and of so formidable a character, that 10,000 steady soldiers could have defended it against an attack by ten times their number. Whilst these important transactions were taking place in the principal seat of operations, the south-eastern division of the invading army, under Brig. Gen. Morrison, had made a conquest of Arracan. On the 24th March, this officer advanced from the camp on the Ooratung river, and, upon entering the passes of this difficult country, encountered the enemy on the 26th, who occupied the hills in force. The Burmese troops were speedily driven into the jungles, from whence they fled for shelter to their works on the Mahattee, abandoning the stockades they had constructed at Chamballa. These works were attacked on the ensuing day. The enemy's position was well-chosen; it was situated on a peninsula, protected by a broad river, fordable only at nearly low-water, the banks steep and covered with sharp stakes. The defences consisted of deep intrenchments along the margin; in the rear, high conical hills, surrounded by entrenched pagodas, served as citadels. Strong as these works were, the enemy, after sustaining a short cannonade, deserted them as soon as the British troops began to cross the river. On the 29th, the troops, joined by Brig. Gen. M'Bean's brigade, moved forward towards Arracan, and approached the position taken up by the enemy for the defence of that capital. It occupied a range of connected hills, strong by nature, further strengthened by art, with only one pass to the city; these heights were defended by artillery, and by about 9,000 Burmese. The advance under Brig. Gen. M'Bean attempted the steep and nearly perpendicular heights in the first range; and although many (amongst others Lieut. Clarke) gained the summit, they were unable to preserve their footing : large stones were rolled on them, and, in spite of their efforts, which lasted till every officer was wounded, the assailants were precipitated to the bottom. The troops and guns were withdrawn without loss; and it being now ascertained that the right of the enemy's defences was the key of his position, and, being naturally strong, was less guarded by men, this point was selected as the object of attack. Brig. Gen. Richards was directed to storm those heights on the evening of the 31st, which he carried without the loss of a man killed, though the enemy's fire was heavy. Amongst the first who entered the stockade on the summit was Summer Sing, a havildar of the 26th regiment of Native Infantry, one of the corps concerned in the unhappy affair at Barrackpore.* Arrangements were made next day to storm the work at the pass, and the defences on the intervening heights. The enemy's troops were, however, panic-struck; as soon as the British moved forward to the assault, the heights were all abandoned, opposition ceased, and the city of Arracan was gained.da The obstacles with which this division of the army had to contend, besides the resistance of the enemy, render the acquisition of Arracan one of the most striking features of the war. No less than 150 miles of road were to be made over hills and across innumerable nullahs, through forests, jungles, and morasses. Brig. Gen. Morrison, upon the occupation of Arracan, despatched a force, under Brig. Gen. M'Bean, to expel the Burmese from the island of Ramree, before the commencement of the rains. That officer reached Ramree Creek on the 21st April, and the following morning the troops were disembarked, and took possession of the town of Ramree without opposition. Gen. M'Bean and Commodore Hayes then proceeded to clear the banks of the Sandowey river of the Burmese troops, who retreated from their works. The rainy season soon after suspended operations at all points. * This individual is described by Brig. Gen. Richards as setting an example of great coolness to his followers. The Brig. General takes occasion in his despatch to remark, that the conduct of this regiment, ever since its employment in the arduous operations in Arracan, has been most exemplary, with respect to gallantry, discipline, steadiness in the field, and patient endurance of privations. The Bengal Government has evinced its sense of this conduct by restoring to the regiment the King's colour, which had been carried over to the mutineers in the affair referred to. ΤΟ WHEN Savage wolves forget to prey; When ocean's mighty bed is dry, And flocks and herds find pasture there; When the pale moon shall rule the day, And winters boast their warmth and light; Then, not till then, my heart shall glow With gentler flame, dear maid, for thee; I love not with sincerity. E. R. TRAVELS |