opposition between God and sin; except the ancient sect of the Manichees, who, not being able to maintain the doctrine of necessity on this ground, contended that there are two principles in Deity, one good, the other evil and that all the good and evil in the world proceed from these two principles. And I would recommend it to the abettors of the present doctrine of necessity, to inquire whether it is more likely that moral good and evil flow from the same principle in Deity, or from contrary principles.

My opponent having finished his arguments in favour of necessity, proceeds to draw several inferences from it to show that there are no conditions in salvation. It will not be necessary for me to notice these inferences; for if his premises are without foundation, as I trust has been made to appear in the foregoing part of this discourse, and will more fully appear in the sequel;-his inferences fall of course, and the doctrine of conditions is supported by the authority of inspiration.

I will now close with a few brief arguments against the doctrine of necessity, and in favour of that of free agency. And here I would repeat the substance of two or three arguments which my opponent passed over without noticing in his Reply, to which this is an

answer.

1. My first argument against necessity is founded on the general character of the Bible, as abounding with commands ;--with promise

to the obedient, and threatenings to the disobedient;-with commendation or censure, according as men behave well or ill;-with the presentation of life and death before mankind, together with every motive to induce them to choose the one and refuse the other;-with expostulations with the presumptuous sinners who slight their own mercies, and solemn declarations by God, that it is not his will that they should continue in sin and be punished, but that they should repent and be saved;—and finally, with lamentations over the finally impenitent and ruined, accompanied with this asseveration on his part, that "he would have gathered and saved them, but they would not." Now, who can reconcile all these things with the necessity of human actions,-the necessity of sin? If mankind are not free agents, if their actions are all predetermined and necessary, they are at best mere sensitive machines, and there is no more propriety in addressing commands and motives to them, than addressing them to wind mills and water wheels. And suppose the master of one of your water shops should take his stand, when every wheel was at rest, and gives his commands to the various machinery, ordering every wheel to move instantly, and with a certain degree of velocity and regularity, and threatening that they should be cut to pieces and burnt in the fire if they did not obey; or suppose, when every wheel was in motion, he should command them instantly to stop, upon pain of his sorest displeasure;

would you not think he was beside himself? And shall we attribute to the God of heaven a line of conduct infinitely more ridiculous?— Shall we represent him as first predetermining the actions of men, making them all as necessary as the motions of a machine, and then commanding, prohibiting, promising, threatening and expostulating with them? This course is proper to be taken only with free agents; and he who takes it with necessary agents, if I may use the expression, not only makes himself ridiculous, but says, by his conduct, that they are free, when they are not, and herein he dissembles, as well as acts the part of a tyrant. And the being who could do this, might, with equal justice, make holy creatures both sinful and miserable to interminable duration.

"No," says my opponent; "for although it would be unjust in God to make man eternally miserable for performing precisely those actions which he had determined before to be done; yet it would not be unjust to subject him to a course of disciplinary punishment for those actions; seeing that thereby his greatest good would be promoted." According to this the penalty of the law is not a curse, as we are taught in the Scriptures, but a blessing; and sin itself is not an evil, but a good, seeing it is the necessary occasion of our greatest happiness.

2. My second argument is taken from what we feel in ourselves. We are conscious of

freedom. We deliberate,-compare,-decide, -re-examine and decide differently; we hope and fear; we feel complacency when we have done right, but remorse and guilt when we have done wrong; because we are conscious we might have done otherwise. We have a very different sensation upon performing an action necessarily, from what we have when our actions are free. Thus if a man injures his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, he feels no guilt, because the action was involuntary and unavoidable; but if he injure him voluntarily, he feels condemnation and guilt. And why this, if his actions are all necessary and unavoidable? Why have we a consciousness of freedom in performing our actions, if they are necessary and unavoidable? Does conscience tell lies in this case? Has God subjected us to this deception? Impossible.

"Whom conscience sent, her sentence will support, And God above assert that God in man."

Let

3. However plausible the doctrine of necessity may appear in theory, nobody was ever yet found willing to admit it in practice. Those who are the loudest in asserting it, complain as soon as others of any injury done them. them be calumniated or defrauded, and you hear no more of the necessity of these actions. No regard is had to its being the "choice" of God, or to its being in "accordance with his will." Is there not great inconsistency here? And upon the supposition that the doctrine of

necessity is true, and that these actions are in "accordance with the will of God," is there not impiety too? For what is piety but resignation to the will of God, and to those events and actions which are in "accordance" with his will? Why should we not regard the will of God in the same light in an instance of calumny or fraud, as we do in an act of justice or mercy, if both are equally in "accordance with his will?" The truth is, the sentiment of all mankind is the same in practice on this subject, and is opposed to the necessity of wrong actions; and were it otherwise it would subvert the order of society, overthrow government, and introduce universal anarchy and ruin. For then no sinner would refrain from what he had an inclination to do, and no crime would be punished, seeing we never punish an action that is necessary and unavoidable, and that is in "accordance with the will of God."

4. The doctrine of necessity implies blasphemy, or no sin at all, according as we consider the evil actions of men with reference to the will of God. If we first say that there is such a thing as sin or moral evil in the world;-if we say that it is a great evil, essentially and diametrically opposed to piety, to justice, mercy, and truth; then it would be horrid blasphemy to say that it proceeded from, or was in "accordance" with the will of God. Because this would not only make him the author of all the sin in the world, but it would also be saying that he has fellowship and agreement with it,