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in the skandhas, implies order of happening. What we may more surely gather from the canon is that, as our own psychological thought has now conceived it,1 the, let us say, given individual "attends to or cognizes (vijānāti) changes in the sensory continuum, and, in consequence, co-efficients of consciousness arise, emotional, volitional, intellectual". All this is in our Manual called a cittuppadoa genesis, an uprising of mind.

Of mind or of thinking. There seems to be a breadth and looseness of implication about cittam fairly parallel to the popular vagueness of the English term. It is true that the Commentary does not sanction the interpretation of contact and all the rest (I refer to the type given in the first answer) as so many attributes of the thought which "has arisen ". The sun rising, it says, is not different from its fiery glory, etc., arising. But the cittam arising is a mere expression to fix the occasion for the induction of the whole concrete psychosis, and connotes no more and no less than it does as a particular constituent of that complex.2

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This is a useful hint. On the other hand, when we consider the synonymous terms for cittam, given in answer 6, and compare the various characteristics of these terms scattered through the Commentary, we find a considerable wealth of content and an inclusion of process and product similar to that of our "thought". For example, "cittam means mental object or presentation (ã ra m m a ņ a m);

1 Professor Ward, op. cit.

2 Asl. 113. I gather, however, that the adjective cet asikam had a wider and a narrower denotation. As wider, it meant "not bodily ", as on p. 6. In the latter it served to distinguish three of the incorporeal skandhas from the fourth, i.e. cittam, as on pp. 265, 318-cittacetasikā dhammā. Or are we to take the Commentator's use of kayik am here to refer to those three skandhas, as is often the case (p. 43, n. 3)? Hardly, since this makes the two meanings of cetasikam self-contradictory. In later Abhidhamma the cetasikas came to be used for the sankhāras. Cf. Compendium, pt. ii; also pp. 124, 193.


that is to say, he thinks; that is to say, he attends to a thought.' Hence my translation might well have run: When a good thought. . . has arisen . . . as the object of this or that sense, etc. Again, cit ta m is defined as a process of connecting (sandhana m) the last (things) as they keep arising in consciousness with that which preceded them.2 Further, it is a co-ordinating, relating, or synthesizing (sandahana m); 3 and, again, it has the property of initiative action (pure carik am). For, when the senseimpression gets to the "door" of the senses, cittam confronts it before the rest of the mental congeries. The sensations are, by cittam, wrought up into that concrete stream of consciousness which they evoke.


Here we have cittam covering both thinking and thought or idea. When we turn to its synonym or quasisynonym m a n o we find, so far as I can discover, that only activity, or else spring, source or nidus of activity, is the aspect taken. The faculty of ideation (m a n indriyam), for instance, while expressly declared to be an equivalent (ve vacana m) of citta m, and, like it, to be that which attends or cognizes (vijā nā ti), is also called a measuring the mental object declared above to be cittam. In a later passage (ibid. 129) it is assigned the function of accepting, receiving, analogous, perhaps, to our technical expression assimilating" (sampaṭiccha na m). In thus appraising or approving, it has all sensory objects for its field, as well as its more especial province of dhammas. These, when thus

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1 Ibid. 63.

2 Asl., pp. 112, 113.


3 Cf. the characteristic-s a mvidahanam-of ceta nā in my note, p. 8.

4 The figure of the city-guardian, given in Mil. 62, is quoted by the Cy.

5 See below, p. 18, and Asl. 123.

It is at the same time said to result in (establishing) fact or conformity (tathabhav o), and to succeed senseperception as such.

See p. 2, n. 3.

distinguished, I take to mean ideas, including images and general notions. And it is probably only in order to distinguish between mind in this abstract functioning and mind as cognition in its most comprehensive sense that we see the two terms held apart in the sentence: "Cittam cognizes the dhammas which are the objects of m a no, just as it cognizes the visual forms, etc., which are the objects of the

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When cittam is thus occupied with the abstract functioning of ma no 2-when, that is, we are reflecting on past experience, in memory or ratiocination-then the more specific term is, I gather, not cittam, but mano viññā ņ a m (corresponding to ca kk huviññā ņam, etc.). This, in the Commentarial psychology, certainly stands for a further stage, a higher "power" of intellection, for "representative cognition ", its specific activity being distinguished as investigating (santiranam), and as fixing or determining (v o t thappanam).

The affix dha tu, whether appended to mano or to mano viññā ņam, probably stands for a slight distinction in aspect of the intellectual process. It may be intended to indicate either of these two stages as an irreducible element, a psychological ultimate, an activity regarded as its own spring or source or basis. Adopted from without by Buddhism, it seems to have been jealously guarded from noumenal implications by the orthodox. Buddhaghosa, indeed, seems to substitute the warning against its abuse for the reason why it had come to be used. According to him, the various lists of dhammas (e.g. in the first answer), when considered under the aspect of phenomena, of emptiness", of non-essence, may be grouped as together forming two classes of dha tu.3 Moreover, each special


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2 Cf. the expression s u d d ha - manod vāro in my note, p. 3. And on what follows, cf. pp. 129, 132, nn.

3 Viz. mano viññāņa-dhatu and dhamma-dhātu see Asl. 153, and below, p. 26, n. 2. The term "element" is similarly used in our own psychology.

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can be so considered (ca k khu-dhātu, etc.; see pp. 214, 215), and so may each kind of sense-object. For, with respect to sense, or the apprehension of form, they are so many phenomenal ultimates the two terms, so to speak, in each sensory relation.

How far dha tu corresponds to vatthu-how far the one is a psychological, the other a physical, conception 1 of source or base is not easily determined. But it is interesting to note that the Commentator only alludes to a basis of thought (cittassa vatthu), that is to the heart (ha da ya - vatthu), when the catechizing is in terms of m a no-dhatu.2 His only comment on "heart", when it is included in the description of cittam (answer [6]), is to say that, whereas it stands for citt a m, it simply represents the inwardness (intimité) of thought. But in the subsequent comment he has a remark of great interest, namely, that the "heart-basis" is the place whither all the "door-objects" come, and where they are assimilated, or received. In this matter the Buddhist philosophy carries on the old Upanishad lore about the heart, just as Aristotle

1 Cf. below, pp. 214, 215, with 209-211. 2 Asl. 264; below, p. 129, n.



3 Asl. 140: "Heart thought (hadayan ti cittam). In the passage (S. i, 207)—' I will either tear out your mind or break your heart '-the heart in the breast is spoken of. In the passage (M. i, 32) Methinks he planes with a heart that knows heart' (like an expert)!—the mind is meant. In the passage The vakkam is the heart-heart is meant as basis. But here cittam is spoken of as heart in the sense of inwardness (abb hantaram)." It is interesting to note that, in enumerating the rupaskandha in the Visuddhi Magga, Buddhaghosa's sole departure from conformity with the Dhamma-Sangani is the inclusion of ha da y a-v att hu after "life". On the reticence of the canon to recognize heart as seat of mind, see S. Z. Aung, Compendium, 278.

The other term, "that which is clear" (p a nḍaram), is an ethical metaphor. The mind is said to be naturally pure, but defiled by incoming corruptions. (Cf. A. i, p. 10.)

4 Cf. Kaushitaki Up. 3, 2; Prāś. Up. 3, 1, 5; samam nayati.

elaborated the dictum of Empedokles that perception and reasoning were carried on in "the blood round the heart".

It is possible that this ancient and widely received tradition of the heart (rather than the brain, for instance) as the seat of the soul or the mind is latent in the question put by Mahākoṭṭhita, a member of the Order, to Sāriputta, the leading apostle : 1 "Inasmuch as these five indriyas (senses) are, in province and in gratification, mutually independent, what process of reference is there,2 and who is it that is gratified by them in common?" So apparently thinks Dr. Neumann, who renders Sariputta's answer—“ The mind (m a n o)" by Herz. This association must, however, not be pressed. For in another version of this dialogue more recently edited, Gotama himself being the person consulted, his interlocutor goes on to ask (S. v, 217 f.): What is the patisaranam of man o of recollection (sati)of emancipation-of Nirvana ? 3 So that the meaning of the first question may simply be that as emancipation looks to, or makes for, Nirvana, and recollection or mindfulness for emancipation, and ideation or thinking refers or looks to

1 M. i, 295.

2 Kim patisaranam. The word is a crux, and may bear more than one meaning. Cf. Vinaya Texts (SBE. xvii), ii, p. 364, n.; Dialogues of the Buddha, i, p. 122, n. Dr. Neumann renders it by Hort, following Childers. Cf. the light thrown by the Commentaries, Bud. Psychology, 1914, 69.

It is worthy of note that, in connexion with the heresy of identifying the self with the physical organism generally (below, p. 259), the Cy. makes no allusion to heart, or other part of the rū pa m, in connexion with views (2) or (4). These apparently resembled Augustine's belief: the soul is wholly present both in the entire body and in each part of it. With regard to view (3), is it possible that Plotinus heard it at Alexandria, or on his Eastern trip? For he, too, held that the body was in the soul", permeated by it as air is by fire (Enn. iv). Buddhaghosa's illustrative metaphor, in Pts. i, 143 f., is "as a flower being 'in' its own perfume". I regret that space fails me to reproduce his analysis of these twenty soul-hypotheses.


'S. v, p. 218. In the replies ma no is referred to s a ti, sati to vimutti, and this to Nirvana.

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