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aggregate of the individual organism from the three collocations called cetasik a (feelings, perceptions, conformations, or synergies), and from that called citta (consciousness, thought, cognition). The atta bhāvo, or personality, minus all mental and moral characteristics, is rūpam.
As such it is one with all rupa m not of its own composition. It is "in touch" with the general impersonal rūpa m, as well as with the mental and moral constituents of other personalities by way of their rupa m. That this intercommunication was held to be possible on the basis, and in virtue of, this common structure was probably as implicit in the Buddhist doctrine as it was explicit in many of the early Greek philosophers. There are no open allusions to "like being known by like" in the Piṭakas as a consciously held and deliberately stated principle or ground of the impressibility of the sentient organism. A fortiori no such statement occurs in our Manual. But the phrase, recurring in the case of each of the special senses, "derived from the four Great Phenomena," may not have been inserted without this implication. Without further evidence, however, I should not be inclined to attach philosophical significance in this direction to it. But, on the one hand, we have an interesting hint in the Commentary that such a principle was held by Buddhist scholars. "Where there is difference of kind (or creature), we read,1 there is no sensory stimulus. According to the Ancients, Sensory stimulus is of similar kinds, not of different kinds.'
And again: "The solid, both within and without, becomes the condition of the sense of touch in the laying hold of the object of perception-in discerning the tangible." It is
1 Asl. 313. Bhūta visese hi sati pasado va na uppajjati. Samānānam bhūtanam hi pasādo, na visamānānan ti” Porānā.
2 Ibid. 315. Ajjhattika-bahira paṭhavi etassa kāyapasādassa ārammaṇagahane . phoṭṭhabbajanane paccayo hoti.
true that Buddhaghosa is discoursing, not on this question, but on what would now be called the specific energy, or specialized functioning, of nerve. Nevertheless, it seems inferable from the quotations that the principle was established. And we know, also, how widely accepted (and also contested) 1 this same principle—Η γνῶσις τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ óuote was in Greece, from Empedokles to Plato and to Plotinus,2 thinkers, all of them, who were affected, through Pythagorism or elsewise, by the East. The vivid description by Buddhaghosa (cf. below, pp. 173-4) of the presence in the seat of vision of the four elements is very suggestive of Plato's account of sight in the "Timæus ", where the principle is admitted.
Whether as a principle, or merely as an empirical fact, the oneness of man's rūpaskandha with the sabbam rūpam without was thoroughly admitted, and carefully taught as orthodox doctrine. And with regard to this kinship, I repeat, a certain philosophical attitude, both theoretical and practical, was inculcated as generally binding. That attitude is, in one of the Majjhima discourses,3 led up to and defined as follows: All good states (d h a m mā) whatever are included in the Four Noble Truths concerning Ill. Now the First Noble Truth unfolds the nature of Ill: that it lies in using the five skandhas for Grasping.5 And the first of
1 Cf. Aristotle's discussion, De An., i, 2, 5.
2 Cf. the passage, Enn. i, 6, 9, reproduced by Goethe: où yap ἂν πώποτε εἶδεν ὀφθαλμὸς ἥλιον ἡγοειδής μὴ γεγενημένος.
3 M. i, 184, et seq.
4 See below, § 1057.
5 Ibid., p. 323. I have retained the meaning of "Grasping as dictated by Buddhaghosa for the group of the Four Kinds of Grasping. Dr. Neumann renders upadanakkhandho by "element of the impulse to live" (Lebenstrieb; an expression doubtlessly prompted by Schopenhauer's philosophy). It would be very desirable to learn from the Papañca-sudani (Buddhaghosa's "Commentary on the Majjhima Nikaya "), whether the Commentator interprets the term to the same effect in both passages. He adheres to it
the five is that of rūpa m. Now rupam comprises the four Great Phenomena and all their derivatives. And the first of the four is Earth (the solid element). Then the solid within, or "belonging to the self", is catalogued, with the injunction that it is to be regarded as it really is with right wisdom (yathābhūtam sam mã paññāya daṭṭhabbam).1 And this means that—while recognizing his kinship with the element to the full-the good student should not identify himself with it so as to see in it a permanent unchanging substance as which he should persist amid transient phenomena. He was to reflect, "This is not mine, it is not I, it is not the soul of me!" It is void of a Self." 2 And so for the other three elements. In their mightiest manifestations-in the earthquake as in the flood, in conflagration as in tempest-they are but temporal, phenomenal ; subject to change and decay. Much more is this true of them when collocated in the human organism. So far from losing himself in his meditation in the All, in Nature, in "cosmic emotion" of any kind, he had to realize that the rūpam in which he participated was but one of the five factors of that life which, in so far as it engulfed and mastered him and bore him drifting along, was the great Ill, the source of pain and delusion. From each of those five factors he had to detach himself in thought, and attain that position of mastery and emancipation whereby alone a better ideal self could emerge temporary as a phenomenal collocation, yet aiming at the eternal. And the practical result of cultivating" this earth-culture" and the rest, as Gotama called it in teaching his son, was that "the mind was no longer entranced by the consideration of things as affecting in Vis. Magga, p. 569. Dhammadinnā, the woman-apostle, explains upā dānam, used with a similar context, as meaning "passionate desire in the five skandhas-of-grasping (M. i, 300).
1 M. iii, 272 f.
2 See above, p. xlii f., where the context leaves no doubt as to what the reflection is meant to emphasize.
him pleasantly or disagreeably",1 but " the equanimity which is based on that which is good was established "2 And he thereat is glad and rightly so-" for thus far he has wrought a great work!" 3
These seem to me some of the more essential features in the Buddhist Dhamma concerning Rūpa.
On the Buddhist Philosophy of Mind and Theory of Intellection.
It would have been the greatest possible gain to our knowledge of the extent to which Buddhism has developed any clear psychological data from its ethics, had it occurred to the compilers of the Dhamma-Sangaņi to introduce an analysis of the other four skandhas parallel to that of the skandha of form. It is true that the whole work, except the book on rūpam, is an inquiry into a rūpino dhamma, i.e. incorporeal, immaterial phenomena, but there is no separate treatment of them divided up as such. Some glimpses we obtain incidentally, most of which have been pointed out in the footnotes to the translation. And it may prove useful to summarize briefly such contribution as may lie therein to the psychology of Buddhism.
And, first, it is very difficult to say to what extent, if at all, such psychological matter as we find is distinctively and originally Buddhist, or how much was merely adopted from contemporary culture and incorporated with the Dhamma. Into this problem I do not here propose to inquire farther. If there be any originality, any new departure in the psychology scattered about the Nikāyas, it is more likely to be in aspect and treatment than in new matter. Buddhism preached a doctrine of regenerate personality, to be sought after and developed by and out of the personal resources of the individual. This development, in the case of the
1 M. i, 423, 424. 2 M. i, 186.
3 Ibid. 191.
religieux, was to be largely effected through a system of intellectual self-culture. Thrown back upon himself, he developed introspection, the study of consciousness. But, again, his doctrine imposed on him the study of psychical states without the psyche. Nature without and nature within met, he was taught, acted and reacted, and the result told on the organism in a natural, orderly, necessary way.1 But there was no one adjusting the machinery.2 The Buddhist might have approved of Leibniz's amendment of Locke's "Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu in the additional phrase "nisi ipse intellectus". But he would not thereby have exalted viññāņam, cittam, or mano to any hypostatic permanence as prior or as immanent. He would only admit the arising of consciousness as a potential reaction to stimuli of sense
Psychological earnestness, then, and psychological inquiry into mental phenomena, coexisting apart from and in opposition to, the usual assumption of a psychical entity: such are the only distinctively Buddhist features which may, in the absence of more positive evidence than we yet possess, be claimed in such analysis of mind as appears in Buddhist ethics.
Of the results of this earnest spirit of inquiry into mental phenomena, in so far as they may be detached from ethical doctrine, and assigned their due place in the history of human ideas, it will be impossible, for several years, to prepare any adequate treatment. Much of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, and even some of the Sutta Piṭaka, still remains unedited.3
Of the former collection nothing has been translated with the exception of the attempt in this volume. And, since Buddhist psychology has an evolution to show covering nearly a thousand years, we have to await fresh materials 1 Cf. Mil. 57-61. 2 Sum. V. i, 194. 3 This is happily now (1923) no longer the case, with the sole exception of most of the metrical legends of the Apadāna.