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we should call logic, they fall into it rather than wield it after the conscious fashion of Plato or Aristotle. Nor is there, in the books, any clear method practised of definition according to genus and species, or of mutual exclusion among concepts. Thus freer in harness, the Buddhist revolutionary philosophy may be said to have attempted a relatively less impracticable task. The development of a science and art of logic in India, as we know it, was later in time; and though Buddhist thinkers helped in that development,1 it coincided precisely with the decline of Buddhistic non-substantialism, with the renascence of Pantheistic thought.


On the Inquiry into Rupam (Form), and the Buddhist Theory of Sense.

Taking dh am ma, then, to mean phenomena considered as knowledge-in other words, as actually or potentially states of consciousness-we may next look more closely into that which the catechism brings out respecting rūpam (Book II and § 583) considered as a species of dhammā. By this procedure we shall best place ourselves at the threshold, so to speak, of the Buddhist position, both as to its psychology and its view of things in general, and be thus better led up to the ethical import of the questions in the first part.

The entire universe of d h a m mã is classed with respect to rupam in questions 1091, 1092 (Book III). They are there shown to be either rūpino, having form, or a-rūpino, not having form. The positive category comprises "the four great phenomena (four elements) and all their derivatives". The negative term refers to what we should call modes or phases of consciousness, or subjective experience that is, to "the skandhas of feeling, perception,

1 Cf. the writer's art. " Logic " (Buddhist): Ency. Religion and Ethics.

synergies, and cognition "--as well as to "unconditioned element". (The skandhas are also "elements "-that is, irreducible but phenomenal factors (see p. 129, n. 1), real although phenomenal.1 Rūp am would thus appear at first sight to be a name for the external world, or for the extended universe, as contrasted with the unextended, mental, psychical, or subjective universe. Personally, I do not find, so far, that the Eastern and Western concepts can be so easily made to coincide. It will be better before, and indeed without, as yet, arriving at any such conclusive judgment to inquire into the application made of the term in the Manual generally.

We find rupa m used in three, at least, of the various meanings assigned to it in the lexicons. It occurs first, and very frequently, as the general name for the objects of the sense of sight. It may then stand as simply rūpam (§ 617, "this which is visible object ", as opposed to § 621, etc., "this which is 'sound', 'odour', " etc.). More usually it is spoken of as rūpāram mana m, object of sight (p. 1), or as rūpāyatanam, sphere (province, Gebiet) of sights or things seen (pp. 172, 183 et seq.). It includes both sensations of colour and lustre and the complex sensations of form. Used in this connexion, it is nearest to its popular meaning of "shape ", shape ", "visible likeness", and its specialization is, of course, only due to the psychological fact that sight is the spokesman and interpreter of all the senses, so that "I see" often stands for "I perceive or discern through two or more modes of sensation ".

On this point it is worth while pointing out an interesting flash of psychological discrimination in the Commentary. It will be noticed in the various kinds of rūpāyatan a m enumerated in § 617 (p. 183, n. 9) that, after pure visual sensations have been instanced, different magnitudes and forms are added, such as "long", "short",

1 Cf. Compendium of Philosophy, p. 255.


etc. On these Buddhaghosa remarks: "Here, inasmuch as we are able to tell 'long', 'short', etc., by touch, while we cannot so discern 'blue', etc., therefore 'long', 'short', and the rest are not objects of vision except figuratively (literally, not without explanation, cf. p. xxxiii, n. 2). A, B, placed in such a relation to C, D, is only by customary usage spoken of as something seen" (Asl. 316).1 This may not bring us up to Berkeley, but it is a farther step in that direction than Aristotle's mere hint-" There is a movement which is perceptible both by Touch and Sight "—when he is alluding to magnitudes, etc., being common sensibles", i.e. perceptible by more than one sense.2


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To resume: Rūpam, in its wider sense (as all form "), may be due to the popular generalization and representative function of the sense of sight, expressed in Tennyson's line :

"For knowledge is of things we see....

And thus, even as a philosophical concept, it may, loosely speaking, have stood for "things seen ", as contrasted with the unseen world of dham mā arūpino. But this is by no means an adequate rendering of the term in its more careful and technical use in the second Book of our Manual. For, as may there be seen, much of the content of "form" is explicitly declared to be invisible.3

Rūpam occurs next, and, with almost equal frequency, together with its opposite, a rūpa m, to signify those two other worlds, realms or planes of temporal existence,

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1 The symbols are my own adaptation, not a literal rendering. In the account of the external senses or Indriyas given in the (later) Sankhya textbooks, Professor Garbe points out that the objects of sight are limited to colour (rūp a), exclusive of form (Garbe, Die Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 258).

2 De Anima, II, vi.

3 Cf. §§ 597 et seq., 657, 658, 751, 752, etc.


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4 To the employment of universe for a va caram exception may be taken, since the latter term means only a

which Buddhism accepted along with other current mythology, and which, taken together with the lowest, or sensuous plane of existence, exhaust the possible modes of rebirth. These a v a car as, or loci of form and non-form, are described in terms of vague localization (§§ 1280-5), but it is not easy to realize how far existence of either sort was conceived with anything like precision. Including the 66 upper grades of the world of sensuous existence, they were more popularly known as heaven or sagga (s varga), i.e. the Bright. Their inhabitants were devas, distinguished into hosts variously named. Like the heaven of the West or the Near East, they were located "above", “upari”, i.e. above each next lower world (cf. below, § 1281, p. 1).1 Unlike that heaven, life in them was temporal, not eternal.

But the Dhamma-sangani throws no new light on the kind of states they were supposed to be. Nor does Buddhaghosa here figure as an Eastern Dante, essaying to body out more fully, either dogmatically or as in a dream,. such ineffable oracles as were hinted at by a Paul "caught up to the third heaven. . . whether in the body or out of the body I cannot tell—God knoweth ", or the ecstatic visions of a John in lonely exile. The Atthasālinī is not free from


part of the Oriental cosmos. I admit it calls for apology. If I have used it throughout Book I, it was because there the term a va caram seemed more suggestive of the logician's term "universe of discourse", or of thought", than of any physically conceived actuality. It seemed to fit De Morgan's definition of the universe of a proposition "-" a collection of all objects which are contemplated as objects about which assertion or denial may take place", the universe of form, for instance, either as a vague, vast concept "in "time and effort, or as a state of mind, a rapt abstraction-in either case a universe of thought" for the time being.


1 The simplest (possibly the oldest) Sutta-statement of the four whereabouts of rebirth other than human is in M. i, 73. Cf. the writer's "Buddhist Theory of Rebirth": Quest Review, Jan., 1922.



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divagations on matters of equally secondary importance to the earnest Buddhist.1 Yet it has nothing to tell of a mode of being endowed with rūpa, yet without the kā mā, or sensuous impulses held to be bound up with rū when the term is used in its wider sense.2 Nor does it enlighten us on the more impalpable denizens of a plane of being where rupa itself is not, and for which no terms seem held appropriate save such as express high fetches of abstract thought. We must go back, after all, to the Nikayas for such brief hints as we can find. We do hear, at least, in the Digha Nikaya, of beings in one of the middle circles of the Form heavens termed Radiant (Abhassara) as "made of mind, feeding on joy, radiating light, traversing the firmament, continuing in beauty ".4 Were it not that we miss here the unending melody sounding through each circle of the Western poet's Paradise 5 we might well apply this description to Dante's "anime liete ", who, like incandescent spheres :

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1 Cf. e.g. on a similar subject, Sum.V. i, 110. Buddhaghosa tells us, it is true (see Asl., p. 332), that the food of the devas who inhabited the highest sphere of the sensuous world was of the maximum degree of refinement, leading perhaps to the inference that in the two superior planes it was not required. 2 See § 595: "All form is that which is

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related, or which belongs to the universe of sense, not to that of form, or to that of the formless."

3 See the four Aruppas, pp. 65-8.

4 D. i, 17. Again we read (D. i, 195), that of the three possible "personalities" of current tradition, one was made of mind, having form, and a complete organism, and one was without form and made of consciousness, or perception (a rūpi (arūpī sa ññāma yo). In M. i, 410 f., devā rūpino manomayā are distinguished from devā arūpino saññāmayā.

5 There is no lack of music in some of the lower Indian heavens. Cf. e.g. M. i, 252, on Sakka the god enjoying the music in his sensuous paradise. And see Vimāna Vatthu, passim.

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