tangible this is that form which is the sphere of the tangible.1

[652] What is that [material] form which is the fluid (aqueous) element (a po dhà tu)?

That which is fluid and belongs to fluid, that which is viscid 2 and belongs to viscous, the cohesiveness of form 3 -this is that [material] form which is the fluid element.

[All] this is that form which is not derived.

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vā

1 Buddhaghosa goes on, with reference to the senses generally, to give a psychological account of the passing from one group of sensations, or object of thought ", to another in terms not far removed from what would now be used to describe the movement of attention" (Asl. 334). We pass from one object to another, (a) from deliberate inclination, or (b) from a sensation of preponderating impressiveness (ajjhāsayato visayadhimattato vā). E.g. (a) from saluting a shrine, a believer forms the intention of entering to do homage to a statue and contemplate the carvings and paintings. (b) While contemplating some vast tope, a man is struck by the sound of music, and is than affected by flowers and incense brought near. 2 Sineho. Cf. the description with that of ā kā sadhātu, § 638.

3 This is the aspect of the moist or liquid element in an object compact of several elements. The one essential "mark" of a po-dhatu is paggharanam, flowing. See § 963. But "cohesiveness of form means the cohering condition of some concrete in which there is superfluity of solid" (Asl. 335). For it is by the cohesive force of the fluid element that lumps of iron or what not are made rigid. Similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palms, tusks, horns, etc.

Hence Buddhaghosa passes on to discuss the mutually related spheres of the elements and their apparent approximations to each other, as in viscous things, e.g. or congealed liquid, or boiling water. Corrupt MSS., however, render parts of the disquisition hard to follow. His conclusion is that whereas the elements may vary in their condition as phenomena, their essential mark never alters, however latent it may be. And he quotes, as the Aṭṭhanaparikappa sutta, A. i, 222, that it is easier for the four elements to change their essential character than for the seeker of Nirvana (the Noble Student) to alter his high estate (Asl. 336).

[653] What is that [material] form 1 which is grasped at (u pādiņņam) ? 2

The spheres of sight, hearing, smell, taste, bodysensibility, femininity, masculinity, life, or whatever form there exists through karma having been wrought, whether it be in the spheres of visible forms, odours, tastes, or the tangible; the element of space, the fluid element, the integration or the subsistence of [material] form, or bodily nutriment this is that [material] form which is grasped at. [654] What is that [material] form which is not grasped at ? The sphere of sound, bodily and vocal intimation, lightness, plasticity and wieldiness of [material] form, its decay and impermanence, of whatever other [material] form exists which is not due to karma having been wrought, whether it be in the sphere of visible forms, smells, tastes, or the tangible; the element of space or that of fluidity; the integration or the subsistence of [material] form, or bodily nutrimentthis is that [material] form which is not grasped at.

1 Here follow the remaining pairs of correlated terms, making up the categories of form under the Dual Aspect. 2 Literally, "which has been grasped at" or laid hold of ". This and the cognate terms are discussed under the "Group on Grasping", § 1213 et seq. It is disappointing to find that, with the exception of two items in the list of things" grasped at ", or come into being through the action of karma (the two phrases are approximately equivalent), the Cy. does not discuss the inclusion of any. One would have liked to hear e.g. why, of all sense-objects, sounds alone are "not grasped at (cf. the heresy concerning sound as result [of karma, KV. 466], and why the elements of space and of fluidity may and may not be grasped at, or what they have to do with it in any way.

Concerning the two items above mentioned, how is it, asks the Cy. (337), "that decay and impermanence' are classed with respect of what is due, and what is not due to the performance of karma? They are classed with what is not grasped at. That which has sprung from conditions other than karma is included under not due to the performance of karma. And as these two forms arise neither from karma nor from formproducing conditions other than karma they are therefore not classified with reference to karma. How they are acquired will become evident later."

[655] What is that form which is both grasped at and favourable to grasping (u pādiņņ' upā dāniyam)?

The spheres of the five senses, femininity, masculinity and life, or whatever other form exists through karma having been wrought, whether it be in the spheres of visible forms, odours, tastes or the tangible, in the elements of space or fluidity, in the integration or the subsistence of form, or in bodily nutriment-this is that form which is both grasped at and favourable to grasping.

[656] What is that [material] form which is not grasped at, but is favourable to grasping (a nupādiņņ' upādā niyam) ? 1

The sphere of sounds, bodily and vocal intimation, the lightness, plasticity, wieldiness, decay and impermanence of form, or whatever other form exists which is not due to karma having been wrought, whether it be in the sphere of visible shapes,2 smells, tastes, the tangible, in the element of space or of fluidity, in the integration, or the subsistence of form, or in bodily nutriment-this is that [material] form which is not grasped at but is favourable to grasping.

[657] What is that [material] form which is visible? The sphere of visible shapes-this is that [material] form which is visible.

[658] What is that [material] form which is invisible? The sphere of vision . . . and bodily nutriment—this is that [material] form which is invisible.3

1 The privative prefixed to the first half of this dvandvacompound does not apply to the latter half. All form is upadaniya m- see § 595 and cf. Dh.S. § 1538. Hence to get, as we do, a positive answer would, if u pādā niyam were to be taken negatively, be a very patent infringement of the law of contradiction. The distributed negative is given by anupadinnanupadaniy am as in § 992.

2 I have elided sadda yata nam, and, on the next line, inserted a po dhātu, as consistent with § 654. Cf. §§ 747, 750, and K.

3 The answer in § 658 recurs with its elided passage very often, but it is not easy to point out the foregoing answer of

[659] What is that [material] form which reacts-andimpinges 1 (s a ppaṭigham) ?

1

The spheres of vision, hearing, smell, taste, bodysensibility; the spheres of visible shapes, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles-this is that [material] form which reactsand-impinges.

[660] What is that [material] form which does not reactor-impinge?

Femininity

and bodily nutriment-this is that

[material] form which does not react-or-impinge.

[661] What is that form which is faculty (in driyam)? The faculties (or personal potentialities) 2 of vision, hearing, smell, taste, body-sensibility, woman, man, life—this is that form which is faculty.

[662] What is that form which is not faculty?

The spheres of visible form. . . and bodily nutriment this is that form which is not faculty.3

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which it is an abbreviation. For §§ 653, 655, include "visible shape", which is absurd". And they do not include "sound", which is invisible. I suggest that § 596 is referred to, with the implication that "the sphere of visible form " must be omitted. All the other terms in § 596, if understood as strictly abstract sensibility or sensation, or as abstract ideas, are inaccessible to sight. Even in "bodily nutriment" it is only the vatthu, or embodiment of the concept of nutriment, that is visible. And similarly, whereas one's bodily gestures are visible, the "intimation given is a matter of inference, a mental construction.

1 Both terms have been applied in the detailed theory of sense given in § 597 et seq.

2 Keeping to § 596 as the norm for these abbreviated replies, we may assume that these two (§§ 659 and 660) divide out that answer between them. Impact and reaction, as here understood, belong exclusively to the sphere of sensation. The term patigho has an emotional and moral significance elsewhere in this work, and means repulsion, repugnance. See § 1060.

3 § 596 would seem to be divided also, and differently, by the indriya m sections. What is na indriyam, not having divas, are thus the five kinds of sense-objects, intimation, space, the three modes of form, and the course, of the evolving rebirth of form as represented in abstract idea.

[663] What is that [material] form which is Great Phenomenon (mahābhūtam)?

The sphere of the tangible and the element of fluidity— this is that [material] form which is Great Phenomenon. [664] What is that [material] form which is not Great Phenomenon?

The sphere of vision . . . and bodily nutriment-this is that [material] form which is not Great Phenomenon.1

[665] What is that [material] form which is intimation (viññatti)?

Bodily and vocal intimation 2--this is that [material] form which is intimation.

[666] What is that [material] form which is not intimation? The sphere of vision . . . and bodily nutriment-this is that [material] form which is not intimation.

[667] What is that [material] form which is sprung from thought (citta-samutṭhānam)? 3

1 This pair of relatives coincides with the first pair of attributes taken inversely forms underived and derived (pp. 172-97).

2 See above, §§ 636, 637. The abbreviated answer concerning the other relative will presumably be the entire list given in § 596, with the exception of the two modes of intimation.

3 Cf. below, §§ 1195, 1196; above, § 636, n.; Comp. 162 (2). Here, after being silent over the last ten questions, the Cy. resumes its parable (p. 337). No creation of matter by mind is implied. The catechism merely refers to matter of some kind as brought into relation with an intelligent agent. And the purest instance of this is those groups of phenomena which are brought into play when the agent is expressing himself. The expression or intimation itself, it says, does not spring directly from mind, but it is said nevertheless to have its source in mind because those phenomena (of gesture and speech) on which the intimation depends are immediately prompted by mind, just as we say that old age and death are" impermanence (in virtue of their forming part of the content of that idea). While there is mind, there is also expression of mind. But the concomitance stated in § 669 is not to be understood like that arising between thought and feeling and other mental processes. He is probably referring to the mental complex indicated above in § 1 and the like.