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1357, 1358. The sign of calm and the sign of grasp.
Purity of morals and of theory.
Purity in views and the struggle of him who holds the views.
(iii), (iv), (v). Agitation on occasions calling for agitation and the struggle of the agitated.
(vi), (vii). Discontent as to good states and unfaltering-
Knowledge in making an end; knowledge in not coming to pass.
Here ends the Table of Contents.
THE UPRISING OF THOUGHTS
PART I.-GOOD STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
The Eight Main Types of Thought relating to the Sensuous Universe (kā māvacara-aṭṭha-mahācittāni).]1
 Which are the states 2 that are good?
When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe 3 has risen, which is accompanied by gladness and associated with knowledge, and has as its object a sight,5 a sound,
1 The brackets enclosing this and all other headings indicate that the latter have been transposed from the position they occupy in the text. There each heading stands at the end of its
2 On this rendering, see Introduction, pt. v. 3 See pp. 1 f., ciii (note).
4 Ñāņa-sam payuttam. According to the Cy., a good thought deserves to be thus distinguished on four grounds: it has arisen through good karma, through present favourable conditions, through maturity of faculties, and from the remoteness or mental and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76). Sampayutta m-lit., con-yoked-is, in the Kathavatthu quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the following relations (between one state" and another): concomitant (sa ha gata), co-existent (s a hajā tā), contiguous (s a msattha), having a common origin (e kuppadā), a common cessation (e ka nirodhā), a common basis embodiment (e kuvatthuka), a common object of attention (ekāramma ņā). In the present work the term is subsequently rendered by "connected ", e.g. in § 1007, etc. The preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam, which I have rendered accompanied by gladness", is
a smell, a taste, a touch,1 a [mental] state, or what not,3 then there is
virtually declared by the Cy. (69 f.) to be here equivalent to somanassa-sampayu t t a m, inasmuch as it is to be interpreted in its fullest intension. Of its five distinguishable shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of "conjoined" (sam satt ha m). And of the four distinguishable connotations of conjoined" the one here selected is that of "coexistent". Thus far, the intricate Buddhaghosa.. But I have yet to discover any attempt to analyse the laws governing the process of association between mental states, such as we first find in Aristotle. On "gladness", sec §§ 10, 18.
5 Rūpārammaņam, saddārammaņa m, etc., i.e. either as a present sensation or as a representative image relating to the past or future; in the language of Hume, as an impression or as an idea; in the more comprehensive German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See above, xxxii.
1 Literally, a tangible object the standard Pali term. 2 Dhammarammaṇa m-the object", that is, of perception, imagination, or ideation (mano, cittam, Asl. 71), just as a thing seen is the object of sight. Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammāramma ņ a m is something outside the range of the senses, and cites M. i, 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas each sense has its specific field, the man o has all these five fields as its scope. At the moment when an object enters "the door of the eye or other sense it enters also the door of the ideating faculty, causing the potential consciousness, or one's being, to vibrate (b h avangacala nassa paccayo hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment, strikes the bough and casts a shadow (ibid. 72). As we might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied by representative cognition. Then, in the course of the mental undulations arising through this disturbance by way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed Mahācittani may emerge. "But in bare representative cognition (s uddha- manodvare) there is no process of sensory stimulation," as when we recall past sense-experience. The process of representation is illustrated in detail, and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology. In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant sensations are described as being simply revived during a subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch, it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator is not here interested in association by contrast as such.
(i) contact (§ 2),
(iv) volition (§ 5),
(v) thought (§ 6),
(vi) application (§ 7),
(vii) sustained thinking (§ 8),
(ix) ease (§ 10),
(x) self-collectedness (§ 11),
(xiii) the faculty of mindfulness (§ 14),
(xx) right intention (§ 21),
(xxix) the power of conscientiousness (§ 30),
or whatever [object the thought] is about." The gist of the comment is that, while no new class of objects is here to be understood over and above those of present or past sensations as specified, there is no serial or numerical order in which these become material for thought (ib. 106 f.).