hoped that the check will be but for a time, as there is certainly no application of capital from which the people, as a great class, will reap such rapid harvests, as from that employed to give their lands the water they want.

When the question has advanced farther, and we have definitive information as to the views of the Home Government regarding terms to be granted to Irrigation Companies, we may perhaps return to the subject.

ART. X.-1. Narrative of the Indian Mutinies of 1857, compiled for the Madras Military Male Orphan Asylum. Madras.

2.

3.

4.

5.

1858.

Narrative of the Campaign of the Delhi Army, by Major H. W. NORMAN, Deputy Adjutant General of the Bengal Army. London. W. H. Dalton. 1858.

A Year's Campaigning in India, from March 1857 to March 1858, by CAPTAIN MEDLEY, Bengal Engineers. London. Thacker & Co.

The Crisis in the Punjab from the 10th of May until the Fall of Delhi. By FREDERICK COOPER, ESQ., C. S. London. Smith, Elder & Co. 1858.

"The Red Pamphlet." The Mutiny of the Bengal Army, by one who has served under SIR C. NAPIER. London. Bosworth and Harrison. 1858.

6. The Defence of Cawnpore by the Troops under the orders of Major General A. Windham, C. B., in November 1857, by Lieut. Col. JOHN ADYE, C. B., Royal Artillery. London. 1858. 7. Memorandum of the three passages of the River Ganges at Cawnpore, during the rainy season of 1857, by the Oude Field Force under the Command of the late MAJOR GENERAL SIR HENRY HAVELOCK, K. C. B.

8. Papers relative to the Mutinies of the East Indies, presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London. 1857, 1858.

LORD Clyde has proclaimed that the war is at an end, that, in Oude, the last strong-hold of the enemy, there is not even a vestige of rebellion. This is a consummation which, we believe, no one would eighteen months ago have dared to prognosticate. Sudden, furious, appalling, as was the first rush of the insurrection, we are lost in greater wonder at the speed and completeness of its suppression. Hatching for years, first giving overt signs in January 1857, it had raised, by the following August, in open and rampant rebellion, the whole country between Bengal and the Punjab; a strip of road alone was held and a few isolated posts defended by British troops. On the 1st January 1859, save Tantia Topee and his hunted rabble, not a foe was in the field. The measures and operations by which this issue has been brought to pass, form the subject which we now purpose to discuss.

We do not intend to investigate the cause or origin of the war; whether it was caused by unjust treatment or mismanage

ment, or over-indulgence of the native army; whether it sprung from Mussulman, Hindoo, or Russian intrigue; whether it was the rising of a nation to throw off a foreign yoke, or the attempt of a party to subvert the existing Government, and seize the supreme power for itself. We, at present, desire to examine only the Military elements of the struggle, the arrangements and operations by which the rebellion has been checked and suppressed. These arrangements and operations naturally divide themselves into those of which the responsibility rested with Government, and those involving the character and conduct of its servants; into the arrangements for reinforcements of troops, and for the protection of posts; the combinations, dispositions and handling of their troops by the Generals; the conduct of officers and men in a contest, which has elicited the exercise of military virtue to a degree almost unparalleled.

We have selected the works which are quoted above, some because they appear to give the best and truest accounts of the operations which they describe, others because they contain statements which we know to be incorrect, or give vent to opinions which we believe to be erroneous. These mistakes we hope to rectify, and to put the facts in their true light. We must also express our regret, that although we are almost inundated with accounts of the operations in the Punjab, at Delhi, in Oude, and the Doab, none of those gallant bands that under Rose, Whitlock, and Roberts, have driven back the wave of rebellion from the South, have yet found champions to chronicle their deeds, second to none which have raised the honor of the British arms to their present glorious height.

In January 1857 the first signs of the coming storm became unmistakeably visible. The Government was warned of it, not only by the conduct of the 19th N. I., but by direct intimations from all quarters and from all classes. Their own European officers, native officers of Corps, sepoys, native gentlemen and native princes, had all furnished representatives to point out the impending danger. There was still ample time to prepare for it. The proper measures, under the circumstances, were to secure the Military posts and arsenals, to strengthen the posi~ tions occupied by Europeans, to make safe the Artillery, to provide for reinforcements.

The Europeans were thus placed.

3. Infantry Regiments in Burmah.

1. Divided between Fort William and Dum-Dum.

One at each of the stations of Dinapore, Lucknow, Agra, and Meerut.

3.

In the Hills over Umballa.

1. At Jullunder and at Ferozepore, at Meean Meer, Sealkote and Rawulpindee.

2. At Peshawur-Total 18.

There were also convalescents at Darjeeling and Landour, a depôt at Chinsurah, veterans and invalids at Chunar, and a Company of the 32nd at Cawnpore. There was one Cavalry Corps at Meerut, and one at Umballa.

Except at Rawulpindee and the Hill Stations, these European Infantry were supported by European Artillery, but there were European Artillery isolated and detached at Benares and Fyzabad, Saugor and Mhow, Umritsur and Mooltan. The native artillery were, the bulk of them, detached with native troops. Our forts and arsenals were Fort William; Chunar and Allahabad on the Ganges; Agra and Delhi in the North West; and in the Punjab, Loodiana, Phillour, Ferozepore, Umritsur, Lahore, Kangra, Mooltan, Attock, and Peshawur. Of these it will be seen from the list above furnished, that Allahabad, Delhi, Loodiana, Phillour, Kangra and Attock, were entirely unprotected; Umritsur and Mooltan contained but a few artillery.

The force in the Punjab was sufficiently large to be comparatively safe; and to enable its ruler to strengthen its position when it should become necessary. The world has rung with the wisdom of the measures by which Sir John Lawrence secured his forts (Mooltan and Umritsur, Attock, Kangra and Phillour) and paralysed the rebel element in the Punjab. But the North West and Bengal were weak, fearfully weak, rendering promptitude and energy absolutely necessary, if it was intended to stave off the coming danger. There was ample time however, to afford strong hopes of success to decisive measures. A ready made opportunity for improving our strategical position existed in the course of the Relief of troops. By extending a Corps Southwards from the Simla Hills, Delhi could be secured with the 60th Rifles. The 52nd left Lucknow in January. They could have been halted at Cawnpore, and quietly employed in securing Allahabad. The 84th might have been sent for long before March to make sure of Fort William. Such, and such like, would have been the measures of a Government cognisant of the coming tempest, but that, at that early period of the crisis, Lord Canning did not believe in its reality, and we are therefore able to give him such credit as may be worth having, for energy and promptitude in acting as he did at a future date, when at last he awoke to the magnitude of the danger.

The troops in Fort William were utterly inadequate to its defence. The utmost they could have done in the event of a mutiny and an attack by the Barrackpore troops, would have

been to concentrate in two or three of the Barracks, and act on the defensive. Gunners there were none. The local authorities did their utmost by doubling the guards, instituting patrols, rousing a spirit of vigilance, and pressing for reinforcements, but it was not until March that the 84th were sent for; it was not until May that the possession of Fort William was secured. Nearly equally important was Allahabad; but not the slightest measure was adopted towards securing it. Eventually, to the influence of Captain Brasyer over his Sikhs, and to it alone, humanly speaking, can the salvation of Allahabad be attributed.

On the 10th of May the mutiny occurred at Meerut; on the 11th of May at Delhi; on the 3rd, the 7th Local Infantry had already mutinied at Lucknow. But it was not till the 16th of May that Government telegraphed to Bombay for the Persian troops, not till the 19th that reinforcements were applied for from England, not till the 18th that the Fusiliers left Madras. From this we may gather that none of the events prior to the outbreak at Delhi had served to shew to the rulers of India, the extent and magnitude of the danger which they would have to encounter, but, now that they had tardily become cognisant of it, the energy, of some of their measures could not be surpassed. But these were few. A few additional Companies, sufficient to ensure possession of the gates of Fort William, were thrown in; the Fusiliers and 84th were at once despatched up country. The invalids from Chunar were thrown into Allahabad, and by the beginning of June the 64th, 78th, 35th, and awing of the 37th reached Calcutta.

Other steps, however, which could not have been adopted too quickly, were not taken till after great delay. The assistance which had been offered by the Ghoorkhas was at first refused, and not accepted till the middle of June. It was not till the 12th June that the Calcutta Volunteer Guards were raised, although their services had been offered in May. It was not till the 14th of June that the native Corps at Barrackpore were disarmed. The king of Oude and his prime minister were arrested on the following day. Lord Elphinstone's proposal to despatch a steamer with the Delhi news, and with application for troops on the 17th May, was rejected. Such were the measures which were adopted at the outset of the rebellion by the Supreme Governinent. Had they been more promptly decided on and executed they would have earned all praise. But the pith of their wisdom appears to have been wanting. In nearly every step Lord Canning was too late to render it thoroughly effective.

It is a pleasure to turn from Bengal to the Punjab. There