Southern Version of the Battle. Southern Version of the Battle. seen the necessity of making | Fredericksburg, with A. P. a rapid division of his own Hill's and Rhodes' (formerly forces, to confront him on two D. H. Hill's) division, to the different fields, and risking the result of fighting relief of Anderson. General Lee brought up the him in detail. divisions of Anderson and McLaws. He occupied the attention of the enemy in front, while General Jackson, with the divisions of Hill, Rhodes, and Trimble, moved by the road that leads from the Mine road, behind the line of battle, to the road that leads to Germanna Ford. This movement of General Jackson occupied nearly the whole of Saturday, May 24, so that he did not get into position at the Wilderness church until near sunset of that day. "About noon Wednesday, the 29th, information was received that the enemy had crossed the Rappahannock in force at Kelly's and Ely's fords above, and were passing forward towards Germanna Mills and Ely's Ford on the Rapidan. Two brigades of Anderson's division, Posey's Mississippians, and Mahone's Virginians, numbering about 8,000 men, and one battery of four guns, were, and had been for several weeks, stationed in the neighborhood of Ely's Ford on the Rapidan, and United States Ford on the Rappahannock, guarding the approaches to Fredericksburg in that direction. It was apparent that this small force would be entirely inadequate to arrest the approach of Hooker's heavy column, and Wright's brigade was ordered up to their support. At daylight on Thursday morning, the head of Wright's brigade reached Chancellorsville, at which point Posey and Mahone had concentrated their forces with a view of making a stand. Major-General Anderson having also arrived in the latter part of the night, and having obtained further information of the number of the Yankee forces, upon consultation with his brigade commanders, determined to fall back from Chancellorsvile in the direction of Fredericksburg, five miles, to a point where the Old Mine road, leading from the United States Ford, crosses the Orange and Fredericksburg turnpike and plank-road. The turnpike and plank-road were parallel to each other from Chancellorsville to the point where the Old Mine road crosses them, and from there to Fredericksburg they make one road. "Chancellorsville is eleven miles above Fredericksburg, and about four miles south of the point of confluence of the Rapidan with the Rappahannock, and consists of a large two-story brick-house, formerly kept as a tavern, and a few out-houses. It is situated on the plank-road leading from Fredericksburg to Orange Court-huse, and is easily ap proached by roads leading from Germanna Mills, and Ely's, United States, and Banks' fords. Between Chancellorsville and the river and above lies the Wilderness, a district of country formerly covered with a scrubby black jack oaks, and a thick, tangled under-growth, but now somewhat cleared up. The ground around Chancellorsville is heavily timbered, and favorable for defense. Seven miles from Chancellorsville, on the road to Fredericksburg, and four miles from the latter place, is Salem Church. "During the night of Thursday, General Lee ordered Jackson to march from his camp below While Jackson was gaining the enemy's rear, McLaws and Anderson had successfully maintained their position in front. Hooker had been felicitating himself upon his supposed good fortune in gaining our rear. What must have been his surprise, then, to find Stonewall Jackson on his extreme right and rear. Jackson's assault was sudden and furious. In a short time he threw Sigel's corps (the 11th) of Dutchmen into a perfect panic, and was driving the whole right wing of the Yankee army fiercely down upon Anderson's and McLaw's sturdy veterans, who, in turn, hurled them back, and rerdered futile their efforts to break through our lower lines, and made it necessary for them to give back toward the river. "There was an intermission of about one hour in the firing from eight until nine o'clock. It was at this time that Jackson received his death wound from his own men, who mistook him for the enemy. General Hill, upon whom the command now devolved, was soon afterwards wounded also, when General Rhodes assumed command until General Stuart could arrive upon that part of the field. Stuart renewed the fight at nine o'clock, night as it was, in accordance with General Jackson's original plan, and did not withhold his blows until the enemy's right had been doubled in on his centre in and around Chancellorsville. "At daylight Sunday morning, our army, which now surrounded the enemy on all sides except towards the river, commenced advancing and closing in upon him at all points. The enemy had dug rifle. pits and cut abatis in front and along his whole line, while his artillery, well protected by earthworks, covered every eminence and swell of rising ground, so as to get a direct and enfilading fire upon our advancing columns. But on our gallant men moved, their ranks played upon by an incessant fire of shell, grape, and cannister, from the front, the right, and left. On they pressed through the wood, over the fields, up the hills, into the very mouths of the enemy's guns and the long line of rifle pits. With a terrible shout they sprang forward, and SOUTHERN VERSION OF THE BATTLE. 23 Southern Version of the Battle. rushing through the tangled abatis, they gained the bank in front of the rifle-pits, when the foe gave way great confusion and fled. "An extraordinary victory appeared to be in our grasp. The capture or destruction of Hooker's army now appeared certain. General Lee, finding the enemy still in force towards the river, ordered the army to form on the plank-road above Chancellorsville, extending his line in a southeasterly direction down the turnpike below Chancellorsville, with his centre resting about the latter point. Just then, news was received that Sedgwick, taking advantage of our weakness, had crossed the river at Fredericksburgh, driven Barksdale from the town, and occupied Marye's bill, after capturing several pieces of the Washington Artil lery. It was also stated that Sedgwick was advancing up the plank-road upon Lee's rear. movement of the enemy was all that saved Hooker from destruction. 44 This The story of the reverse at Fredericksburg is easily told. Our forces in defense of the line, commencing at Marye's hill and terminating at Hamil ton's crossing, consisted of General Barksdale's brigade and General Early's division. General Barksdale held the extreme left. His line had its beginning at a point two hundred yards north of Marye's heights, and extended a mile and a half to a point opposite the pontoon bridge on the left of Mansfield. This brigade, on the morning of the battle, did not exceed two thousand in numbers, rank and file, and throughout the entire length of its line had no other support than six pieces of the Washington Artillery, which were posted on Marye's heights, and Read's battery, which was placed in position on the hill to the left of Howison's house. Against this position the enemy brought to bear the command of Gibbins on the left flank, and about twenty thousand of Sedgwick's corps. The first assault was made in front of the stone wall, as in the case of last December, and was signally repulsed. This was repeated three times, and on each occasion the handful of men behind the wall, with shouts of enthusiasm and deadly volleys, drove back the assailants. The first charge was made before sunrise, and the others in as rapid succession as was possible after rallying and re-enforcement. About nine o'clock in the morning the enemy adopted the ruse of requesting a flag of truce, for the alleged purpose of carrying off the wounded, but for the real object of ascertaining our force. The flag was granted, and thereby our insufficient defense was exposed, the bearer coming up on the left flank from a direction whence our whole line was visible. Immediately after the conclusion of the truce, the enemy re-enforced their front, and Southern Version of the Battle. threw the whole of Gibbins' division on our left, defended by the Twenty-first Mississippi regiment alone, commanded by Colonel B. J. Humphreys. This regiment faced the advancing host without quailing, and, after firing until but a few feet intervened between them and the foe, they clubbed muskets and successfully dashed back the front line of their assailants. The enemy by the force of overwhelming numbers, however, broke through our line, and Marye's hill was flanked about eleven o'clock Sunday morning. The turn which events had taken in front of Fredericksburg made it necessary for General Lee to arrest the pursuit of Hooker, and caused him to send back to Fredericksburg the divisions of Anderson and McLaws to check the advance of Sedgwick. General McLaws moved down the plank-road to reenforce Barksdale and Wilcox, the latter of whom had been observing Banks' Ford and who had been driven back to Salem Church. McLaws reaching Salem Church in time to relieve Wilcox from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, checked the advance of Sedgwick, and drove him back, with great loss to both parties, until night closed the conflict. "The enemy, however, was not yet defeated. One more struggle remained, and to make that the enemy during the night massed a heavy force against McLaws' left, in order to establish communication with Hooker along the river road. Anderson moved rapidly to the support of McLaws, and reached the church about 12 M., having marched fifteen miles. General Lee having arrived on the field, ordered Anderson to move round the church and establish his right on Early's left, (Early having come up from Hamilton's crossing, in rear of the enemy). The enemy having weakened his left in order to force McLaws and gain the river road, General Lee massed a heavy force upon this weakened part of the enemy, and at a concerted signal, Anderson and Early rushed upon the enemy's left. The signal for the general attack was not given until just before sunset, when our men rushed upon the enemy like a hurricane. But little resistance was made, the beaten foe having fled in wild confusion in the direction of Banks' Ford. At dark a short pause ensued; but as soon as the moon rose, the enemy was speedily driven to Banks' Ford, and on that night of the 4th of May ended this remarkable series of battles on the lines of the Rappahannock. "The enemy being driven from every point around Fredericksburg, General Lee determined to make short work of Hooker at United States Ford. Therefore, Tuesday noon Anderson was ordered to Southern Version of the Battle. proceed immediately back to Chancellorsville, while McLaws was instructed to take up his position in front of United States Ford, at or near the junction of the Old Mine and River roads. But a drenching storm of wind and rain set in and continued without cessation until Wednesday forenoon, when it was discovered that Hooker, taking advantage of the darkness and the storm, night. "Our forces engaged in the fight did not exceed fifty thousand men. The enemy's is variously estimated at from one hundred thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand. Yet the greater gallantry of our troops, even despite the emergency into which their commander had brought them, enabled him not only to beat this immense army, but to capture several thousand prisoners thirty or forty thousand small arms, several stands of colors, and an im mense amount of personal property, and to kill and wound some twenty-five thousand men. It was a glorious week's work." ground, at the same time facilitating Jackson's movement around the National lines, to the right and rear. The second position was one simply of defense, closely formed around Chancellor's. The Federal leader was perfectly confident of his success when informed of the rebel move The Lines, had also retreated across the river the preceding around his right. At nine A.M., May 2d, having made inspection of his lines, he advised the two corps commanders (11th and 12th) of the probable rebel design, and enjoined such a disposition in pickets, line and reserves, as would meet any emergency. This order was preceded by one directed to Reynolds, (1st Corps,) ordering him to join the right. All of which demonstrates that Hooker was fully alive to the situation, and, with a reasonable discharge of duty by the troops, that the evident inferiority of position was immaterial to the general result. But, to further secure his safety from surprise, he dispatched Sickles (3d Corps) with two full divisions to follow up the Confederate flanking column and unmask both its strength and purpose. Sickles marched with promptness, but reached Jackson's line of march, near "the Furnace," only after the main column had passed. The rebel rear guard was overtaken, and quite a number captured. "From these prisoners," says the Congressional report, “it was ascertained that this column of the enemy consisted of Jackson's corps, numbering about twenty-five thousand men, and that their route was over a by-road through the forest, (the 'Wilderness,) passing diagonally across the front of the Union lines, and approaching to within two or three miles of the right of the 11th Corps, which occupied the extreme right of the army." The Federal commandHooker's Error. er's mistake was, want of rapidity in scizing advantages of position. By not obtaining his corps locations on the 30th, he gave Lee time to move up from Fredericksburg in such force as to dispute possession of the line which, by its elevation, was the natural one for offense or defense nearest Chancellor's. Not until the morning of May 1st did the order issue for the advance to Tabernacle church. This order was in course of execution when it was so disputed by the enemy as to constrain Hooker to countermand the advance and recall the column. Against this it is in evidence that his commanders (Couch and Meade) protested. Meade's two divisions, (Hancock and Sykes,) comprising the Federal centre, had advanced along the turnpike to the first ridge, over a mile toward Fredericksburg, when they encountered the divisions of McLaws and Anderson. After a sharp conflict the position was won, by Sykes, at noon. Slocum's Corps (12th) forming the Federal right, moved east by the plank road, and obtained its position without obstruction. The Federal left, (5th Corps.) comprised of the divisions of Griffin and Humphreys, advanced along the river road five miles, until Banks' Ford was quite uncovered. The retirement from this initial point, gave to the enemy the advantage of At this stage of the events of the day, it appears that considerable confusion prevailed as to the nature of the movement in question. Sickles was inclined to think that the rebel main column was moving off toward Richmond, and, at first so advised his chief, whereupon Hooker dispatched the same view to Sedgwick; while, acting also under this impression, he answered Sickles' call for reenforcements to press the enemy, by detaching two brigades-Williamson's from 12th, and Barlow's from 11th Corps-adding a the direction of the "old Jackson's Assault. brigade of cavalry, under Pleasanton. But, the dense forest so completely masked the enemy's rapid columns, that Hooker's extremely parallel but to the north of the plank road. right was struck about six P. M., May 2d, ere The assault, as usual with that officer's moveit was fully known where Jackson was. That ment, was one of great impetuosity. The air it was a surprise is evident, for the Union rang with the frenzied "whoops!" of the lines were caught in reverse (facing south) three attacking divisions, while their rapidity only the extreme right brigade facing west- of action served to astonish the Union ranks. ward! Whose fault was this? Hooker's Something of a panic followed, greatly intenorder of nine A. M. of that day directed to sified by the stampede of the trains, parked Generals Warren and Slocum, read: on the right, near the unexpected battle line. The brigade first struck (Gilsa's, of Devens' division) made a b ief stand, but broke after two or three irregular rounds of musketry, McLean's brigade, out flanked, quickly retired, preserving but little order upon its going, down the road along which the corps' line was drawn. Carl Schurz's division, facing south, was overr n by the fugitives, and lost its battle formation as a division, though Schimmelfennig's brigade, with admirable skill and spirit, made the difficult change of front, and for an hour stuck to its post with exceeding pertinacity. Bushbeck's brigade, also, changed front, and retired from the field only step by step, as driven by the hard pressing and elated Confederates.* I am directed by the Major-General Commanding to say that the disposition you have made of your Corps has been with a view to a front attack by the If he should throw himself upon your enemy. flank, he wishes you to examine the ground, and determine upon the positions you will take in that event, in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances. He suggests that you have heavy reserves in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defenses worth naming have been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity at that point, and not, in the General's opinion, as favorably posted as might be." And when the same order added: "We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach," it needs a positive abjuration of this order to fix upon the General commanding the responsibility of surprise or want of preparation. Lee, with two divisions only, was feigning attack on the front, compelling attention in that direction, but the intermittent character of his brigade demonstrations must have shown to a quick military eye that they were but feints.* fore remained for Sickles to retire from his advanced and somewhat perilous position and to assist in restoring the National fortunes on Be the responsibility whose it may, Jackson burst from cover about six P. M., from the right. Pleasanton, with his cavalry, was |