The Lieutenant-Gene

ralship.

The Lieutenant-Generalship.

rank permanent, instead of limiting its duration to the then existing war. Mr. Lincoln approved this measure March 1st, on which day he nominated General Grant to the post. This the Senate confirmed, March 2d, when the 'hero of the West' became the ranking officer of the United States Army.

THE creation of the office | grade of Lieutenant-Geneof Lieutenant-General rua- ral - General Scott then terially changed the aspect holding it only as a "breof affairs. The purpose was less to honor an vet." To this proposition the House finally eminent soldier than to give the field com- assented, February 1st, 1864, with a proviso mand to one whose rank should be incon- recommending General Grant for the office. testibly above that of all others-thus doing The Senate concurred, Feb. 24th, only amendaway with the wretched jealousies in regarding the House resolution so as to make the to priority, and uniting armies under one active head. The country and Congress were tired of the War Office's management. The vast armies were operating spasmodically-a stroke and then a rest, giving the enemy, controlling the inner lines of communication, every facility for concentration, and thus making their three hundred thousand men equal to twice that number in field effect. The superbly ordered system for prosecuting the war, conceived and ordained, so far as was in his power, by General Scott-that of steady and simultaneous pressure--had been ignored; each army had acted apparently with but slight reference to what was being done elsewhere. Banks, Grant, Rosecrans, Schofield, Burnside, Meade, Butler, Foster and Gilmore were supreme in their several departments, governed almost wholly by their own views and wishes. The General-in-Chief was presumed to exercise authority over all; but, the history of the Army of the Potomac, of the wretched Red river campaign, of operations in Tennessee under Rosecrans, show how very little practical unity there was in General Halleck's sy tem of offense. This, Congress sought to correct by the creation of the new office. Soon after the opening of the December session, 1863, Mr. Washburn, of Illinois, proposed the revival of the full

This, the party of action most heartily approved. Grant's reticence and devotion to duty had made him less known, personally, than any of the Department commanders; but, the fame of his work accomplished was the nation's heritage, and the bestowal of the honor upon him was simply in answer to the popular demand. Summoned to Washington, by telegraph, the General was found ready for any new responsibility. March 8th he reached the Capital to receive the trust. At one P. M., March 9th, the delivery of the commission took place in the Presidential Mansion, in the presence of the Cabinet, General-in-Chief Halleck, and a few other distinguished guests. The President, presenting the commission, said:

"GENERAL GRANT: The nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what still remains to be accomplished in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commis sion, constituting you Lieutenant General in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves

'First. Majcr-General Halleck is, at his own re-inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do quest, relieved from duty as Lieutenant-General-inChief of the army, and Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant is assigned to the command of the armies of the United States. The headquarters of the army will be in Washington, and also with Lieutenant-position. General Grant, in the field.

HOW THE CAMPAIGN

ception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the country."

The Situation.

Of the situation of the contending forces, when the Lieutenant-General took command, he presented this view:

"The Mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Mo., to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream A few points in southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the

How the Campaign was to be Fought.

To crush the enemy's two main armies, and to reach their two citadels of defense, was the sole end to be attained. Those armies crushed, or those citadels taken, must, Grant conceived, break the Confederate power past resuscitation. He said:

"The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best Generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strong intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry

In

force under Forrest in Northeast Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah

Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and ex

vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field, had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The let alone policy had demoralized this force, so that probably not more than one half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi, we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Ga. West Vir To the work in Georgia Sherman was deginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, tailed. How well chosen was his instrument with the exception of the northern border, the Po- the result attested. "General Sherman," the tomac river, a small area about the mouth of James Lieutenant-General wrote, was instructed to river, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort move against Johnston's army, to break it up, Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of and to go into the interior of the enemy's the Potomac lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the seacoast, foot-country as far as he could, inflicting all the

holds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington,

and Newbern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly, and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy.

*

"Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas and a large population disloyal to the

treme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our seacoast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign."

damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign,

SO.

How the Campaign was to be Fought.

and was satisfied that he understood them, | Lee went he would go also. and would execute them to the fullest extent For his movement two possible." A very unusual way of ordering a plans presented themgrand campaign, simply to 'talk it over;' but, selves: One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, the two men so thoroughly understood one moving by his right flank; the other above, another that elaborate specifications were un- moving by his left. Each presented advannecessary, had they been possible. tages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going North on a raid. But, if we took this route, all we did would have to be done while the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to co-operate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be used as a basis of supplies until another was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route."

All things were to be made tributary to Sherman's success. Even the then well advanced Red river Expedition, upon which Halleck hd counted so much, was to be abandoned, if the return of Sherman's troops, loaned to Banks, should reduce the expeditionary force below what was requisite for success. Banks, indeed, was re-instructed. Said Grant:

“Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red river against Shreveport, Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me, on the 15th of March, of the importance it was that Shreve port should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that, should his expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing ne move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him mote easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other move ments; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstratration, as Steele thought ad

visable."

And on the 31st, further and more detailed advices were issued to the Gulf Department Commander, designed to make movements in Louisiana co-operative with other army ad

vances.

Meade, as commander of the Army of the Potomac, was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever

To General Butler was committed a most important mission. As the orders addressed to that commander reveal the plan of advance upon Richmond, they should be here repeated:

"FORT MONROE, Va., April 2, 1864. "GENERAL: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as prac ticable, it is proposed to have co-operative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater object toward which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the object ive point. You will collect all the forces from