externals which are all in all with the generality of mankind.

The disservice rendered to mesmerism by its name, is this: It has turned men from true inquiry, and, like a tub thrown out to the whale, has served as an object of attack, while the real point in debate has remained untouched altogether. We have asked whether such a power as mesmerism exists; when we should rather have demanded whether there is a state so denominated. It will at once be seen in what material respects the two questions differ. The first presumes, even while it professes to seek, a specific cause for certain phenomena;- the second merely regards the phenomena themselves, and inquires Do such and such facts exist? Each inquiry should be kept carefully distinct, and yet they have unfortunately been mixed up together; or rather an unhappy priority has been granted to the first, involving the very existence of the second. For it is plain that when we demand, "Is there such a power as mes merism?” the answer may ever be "No;" and then, by a too common injustice, we extend the negative over the whole question, there being but few who will not confound a mistake and the object mistaken in one general anathema. Did we, however, clearly perceive that "Power is nothing more than the relation of one object, or event, as invariably antecedent to another object or event,"* we should perceive that the facts called mesmeric, have as much claim to be

* Brown's Philosophy of the Human Mind.

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considered realities, as if indeed there were a magnetic power or influence.

Of the error of the mesmerists in bestowing an illjudged appellation, the opposite party have taken ample advantage. They have thrust forward the unlucky cognomen into the very van of discussion, and have thus compelled an inquiry into the cause of mesmerism, before the phenomena could be well considered. Surely it must be conceded that so singular an inversion of true philosophical investigation cannot but have proved highly detrimental to the subject of our discussion. In what other matter have we acted so strangely as to inquire into the secret cause, before men are well agreed respecting the visible effects? Do we not, in conducting an important analysis, first ascertain the phenomena, their characteristics, and the circumstances under which they appear; and then, after long and careful induction, name-but with caution- some pervading principle into which they may all be harmoniously resolved? Not only is it natural thus to commence a course of reasoning with what is nearest to our apprehensions, but, by so doing, we secure that essential requisite to an argument - a firm and undebateable ground, where both he who would convince, and he who is to be persuaded, may meet as on a neutral territory, and, taking a common point for starting, be advantaged with at least a probability of arriving at a common conclusion. Facts are this neutral ground; -facts are this point of vantage; for it is to be remarked that respecting outward and visible pheno

mena there is ordinarily but little difference of opinion, while, in reference to hidden causes, men ever are and must be divided. For instance, every one knows the sensation of light, and may convince himself, if he pleases, that under such and such circumstances, such and such phenomena do occur. So far mankind are agreed: but when we would assign the primary cause of light and its phenomena, we find the war commenced, and opinions far divided some adopting the undulatory theory, while others fondly cling to the Newtonian doctrine of emitted rays.

It is no wonder, then, that the premature assumption of a specific cause for the phenomena of mesmeric somnambulism should have shocked men in the outset, and have indisposed them, through the medium of their prejudices, for calm investigation. Under this head of offence may be classed, also, such technical expressions as "magnetised water," "magnetised trees," &c. The ideas, which these terms convey, are vague and unpleasing. Who can tell that their meaning simply is, water, or trees, breathed upon, or touched by the hand, after a certain formula? The vocabulary of every science has been, to the uninitiated, foolishness; - but the nomenclature of mesmerism is worse: it has been a scare-crow even to the wise.

I confess that of all the causes, which have contributed to render mesmerism unpopular, this is to me the most discouraging. To make a dispute verbal is to make it endless, and the erroneous way in which our subject has been considered, has trans

ferred its merits from things to words-a sad and barren exchange! All hope of an accommodation between the friends and foes of mesmerism is thus rendered doubtful. How, indeed, can they calmly discuss the matter, when the first bare mention of it is a sort of Slogan or battle-yell, that raises a conflict sufficient to drown the voice of Reason for ever? How shall they decide a truth, whose fate depends upon the propriety or impropriety of its name? How shall they adjudge the real business in hand, seeing that preliminaries can never be adjusted? The subject has indeed fallen into the very Chancery Court of Philosophy.

That men should be so easily entrapped into pursuing a shadow, while the substance has eluded their observation, may seem strange; but, words being the media of our thoughts, we are naturally so influenced by them that even the most clear-judging find it difficult not to be diverted by a verbal inaccuracy from more important matters. The fate of Hartley's Theory of Sensation is a proof of this. All the world fastened so vehemently upon the unlucky term "vibration," and were so intent upon proving that the soft and loose chords, which compose the nervous system, could never properly be said to vibrate, that the true merits of a very beautiful hypothesis were overlooked.

Thirdly. Nearly connected with the erroneous naming of mesmerism, is the circumstance next in order, which has thrown a blight over its pretensions, I mean the decision, in its disfavour, of the French Academy, in 1784. Since then, it has been con

sidered as worse than unexamined; it has been conceived to have undergone examination, and to have been found worthless. Since then, to revive an interest upon such a condemned subject has been nearly as impossible as to restore life to a corpse by galvanism. Since then, instead of a mystery, it has been regarded as a delusion; and the world has turned away from it with the same sort of flat disappointment which we experience, when, after having trembled at the haunted chambers, dusky veils, and heaving coverlids of a romance, we are chilled into our sober senses by the earthly explanations of its concluding pages. The magician's wand is broken for ever: we like to be frightened, but hate to find ourselves deceived. The attractive ever perishes with the supernatural. But to those who read and inquire for themselves, there is nothing whatever in the decision of the French Academy of Science which can be considered as destructive of mesmerism. What is it that the Academy decided? Few know, few care to inquire. A general impression has gone abroad, that mesmerism received, in 1784, its coup de grace; and there men are content to let the matter rest; for are they not thus saved the trouble of thinking? How pleasant to believe in the eternal banishment of a subject, concerning which, the idle, the self-interested, and the prejudiced have each their several motives for saying, as some honest churchman did of the Athanasian Creed, "I wish we were well rid of it." The blessed consummation is not, however, so easy of attainment; for