effectually to the attainment of that desirable end; they require so much abstraction of thought-they include such lengthened trains of connected reasoning-they yield such perfect satisfaction and conviction,--that the vigorous application of the powers of the understanding to these sciences, cannot fail to impart to them a tone and energy which otherwise they would not possess. But next to these, which unquestionably occupy the highest rank in practical utility, it may be safely affirmed, that logic occupies no mean place, and exerts no ordinary influence on the intellectual faculties. For what is logic, but a development of those principles on which mathematical reasonings are founded, and a systematic classification of the elements of mathematical knowledge? A modern writer of considerable eminence has, therefore, most fitly termed mathematics" the noblest praxis of logic." "Is it," says Dr. Reid," of no use in reasoning, to be well acquainted with the various powers of the human understanding, by which we reason? Is it of no use to resolve the various kinds of reasoning into their simple elements, and to discover, as far as we are able, the rules by which these elements are combined in judging and reasoning? Is it of no use to mark the various fallacies in reasoning, by which even the most ingenious men have been led into error? It must surely betray great want of understanding to think these things useless and unimportant. Yet these are the things which logicians have attempted, and which they have executed,-not indeed so completely as to leave no room for improvement, but in

such a manner as to give very considerable aid to our reasoning powers. That the principles laid down with regard to definition and division-with regard to the conversion and opposition of propositions and the general rules of reasoning--are not without use, is sufficiently apparent from the blunders of those who disdain any acquaintance with them."-Reid's Analysis, chap. v. sect. 1.

141. Such being the objects of logic, its general utility must be apparent; but it may still be questioned, with reference to the dialectics of former ages, and especially the logic of Aristotle, how far they were fitted to attain the proposed end? That these are curious and venerable monuments of antiquity, few who are acquainted with them will feel disposed to question; and that these are parts of the ancient systems of logic, which, being founded in reason and truth, must prove permanently useful, and have consequently formed essential parts of all modern treatises on the subject, is equally evident. None can regret that the idolatry and despotism of Aristotle have ceased; nor can any one seriously wish that the period should return in which the Categories should be venerated, as the most perfect classification of the objects of knowledge; or that all the moods and figures of syllogism should be again distinguished by barbarous technical phrases, though they were not wholly without their use. It is well that these are now regarded rather as matters of literary curiosity, than as constituting parts of a logical education. Yet if we reflect on the necessity of accurate discrimination in order to dis

cern things that differ, and the importance of method to success in almost every undertaking, we cannot but be convinced that the rules of syllogistic reasoning, and the methodical arrangement of ideas and propositions, which logic suggests, may assist both in the detection of error, and the development of truth. And here, in confirmation of these remarks, the writer cannot forbear to cite once more an author, who certainly cannot be justly accused of an undue deference to the authority of the ancients. "There is perhaps no practical art which may not be acquired, in a very considerable degree, by example and practice, without reducing it to rules. But practice, joined with rules, may carry a man further on in his art, and more quickly than practice without rules. Every ingenious artist knows the utility of having his art reduced to rule, and by that means made a SCIEnce. He is thereby enlightened in his practice, and works with more assurance. By rules he sometimes corrects his own errors, and often detects the errors of others. He finds them of great use to confirm his judgment, to justify what is right, and to condemn what is wrong." Alluding more particularly to the ancient dialectics, the same writer remarks most justly, that "although the art of categorical syllogism is better fitted for scholastic litigation than for real improvement in knowledge, it is a venerable piece of antiquity, and a great effort of human genius. We admire the pyramids of Egypt, and the wall of China, though useless burdens on the earth; we can bear the most minute description of them, and travel hundreds

of leagues to see them: if any person should, with sacrilegious hands, destroy or deface them, his memory would be held in abhorrence. The predicaments and predicables, the analytics and topics, the rules of syllogism and the dialectics of ancient philosophy, have a like title to our veneration as antiquities. They are uncommon efforts, not of physical power, but of human genius, and they make a remarkable period in the progress of human reason."-Reid's Analysis of Aristotle's Logic,

c. v. sect. 1.

N

CHAPTER VI.

ANCIENT METAPHYSICS.

ON

SECTION I.

THE ORIGIN AND PROGRESS OF METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE AMONG THE PHILOSOPHERS OF GREECE.

142. THE present work being chiefly intended for the instruction of youth, it would be evidently improper to enter far into this department of ancient literature. It could answer no valuable end to conduct the young inquirer through all those mazes of abstract speculation, in which the philosophers of antiquity indulged, and amidst which minds of maturer growth have been perplexed and bewildered. The detail would be both uninteresting and unprofitable. Yet, as these speculations form an essential part of the history of ancient philosophy, it would be improper to pass them over unnoticed. It will be therefore attempted, in this division of our historical review, to make a selection, and exhibit, in as simple a form as possible, the distinguishing tenets of the most celebrated philosophers and the principal sects, passing over those which, either on account of their vagueness or their absurdity, may justly be consigned to perpetual oblivion. From the distinction suggested in the introductory chapter, it will be apparent that the division of