all the infults which their coafts, and that city and port in particular, had formerly endured, feemed now, at one stroke, to be done

away.

The appearance of the numerous prifoners, confifting of all orders and denominations, and refembling, more the various inhabitants of a facked city, than the ordinary crews of a fleet, feemed to render even the triumph more complete, and made the fight fill more fingular. They confifted of 1520 feamen, including their proper officers; of 1255 foldiers, part in the fervice of the crown, and part in that of the Eaft-India company; of 74 land officers; of 149 women; and of 137 paffengers, of both fexes, among whom were fome married and unmarried ladies of condition. The whole amounting to 2865 perfons. The value of the faleable commodities was great; but the lofs of the military and naval fupplies, both to government and the Eaft-India company, was much more confiderable, as they could not be replaced in time: and it was rendered the more particularly unfortunate to the latter, by the then very critical (though in Europe yet unknown) ftate of their affairs in the

Eaft.

About the fame time an account was received of the lofs of a great part of the valuable outward-bound Quebec fleet, which was intercepted off the banks of Newfoundland, in the beginning of July, by fome American privateers. Some of thefe veffels were retaken; but about fourteen rich fhips were carried entirely off.

Thefe heavy loffes, which, in their nearer or more remote confe

quences, affected all orders of people, fpread a general gloom throughout the nation. That diffatisfaction which had long prevailed among many, with refpect to the conduct and government of the navy, now became general, and was loudly vented in clamour and reproach. As the combined fleets were known to be at Cadiz, and their putting to fea anxioufly apprehended, it was afked, why the convoy was thrown into their mouths, by fending it fo clofe to the coaft of Spain? Or if there had been any neceffity for fending it that courfe (which was however denied), why was it not better guarded? Why truft fo immenfe a property, and of fuch peculiar importance, to a fingle man-of-war and two frigates? Could the weftern, or grand fleet, as it was called, have been better employed, that in guarding fo valuable a convoy till it was out of danger?

When to these questions it was anfwered, that the caufe of the convoy's taking that courfe, was in order to accommodate the merchants, and the Eaft-India company, who wanted to take in wines at Madeira; it was, in the first place, replied, that it was by no means neceffary to fteer fo close to the continent of Europe, in order to touch at Madeira; as there was not a force fufficient for the protection of the convoy, the course fhould have been varied, and fuited to the emergency and danger. But it was infifted, that the ac commodation of the merchants, in fo very trifling a particular, was by no means to be admitted as a reafon for touching at all at Madeira, when fo great a prize was at ftake, and its fafety thereby in any [4] 2

degree

degree hazarded. The merchants might have provided their wines in another manner. They were no politicians. The confideration of fuch matters, belonged properly and folely to the minifters at large, and to the admiralty in particular. They poffeffed, or ought to poffefs, fuperior political knowledge, and they had all the means of information fully in their hands. It was their business and duty, in all fuch cafes, to cure the ignorance, or to correct the selfishness, of the merchants. Such were a few of the topics ufed at that time upon the fubject.

Aug. 18. Upon the return of the fleet to Portsmouth, Ad1780. miral Geary chose to refign the command. The former difficulty again recurred. It was offered to Admiral Barrington, who had been his fecond upon the late cruize, and of whofe abilities every body was convinced. From whatever cause or caufes it proceeded, that thofe profeffional honours and diftinctions, which at all other times had been emulously fought after, and even grafped at with the utmost avidity, were now avoided, so it was, that that brave and excellent officer declined the command. He, however, offered his fervices, to affift and fecond whoever fhould be appointed. In thefe circumftances, it was bestowed on Admiral Darby, who stood next in rank to Mr. Barrington.

The grand fleet failed again, a little before the middle of September, but was detained by contrary winds for fome time at Tor-bay. In the mean time (as we fhall hereafter more fully explain), the Count de Guichen, inftead of directing his courfe from the Weft

Indies to America, as had been expected and intended, found his fhips fo thattered, and his crews fo extremely fickly, that he judged it neceffary, to proceed directly, with the great convoy under his charge, to Europe. It is probable, that his apprehenfion of falling in with the British fleet, was the motive of his directing his course to Cadiz, where he arrived towards the latter end of October, with eighteen fail of the line, and feveral frigates. There he found M. de Eftaign, with a large fleet, in readinefs to receive and conduct him and his convoy to the French ports. The French united fleet was now numerous; amounting to thirty-fix fail of the line, two fifties, and a cloud of frigates. Notwithstanding which, as the British fleet under Admiral Darby was now known to be in the way, the Spaniards conducted them almoft as far as Cape Finisterre. It is indeed faid, that all the enemies fleets were in very bad condition and that those which had scarcely gone out of fight of Cadiz during the campaign, had little more to boaft of in that refpect, than the ships which had gone through so much hard fervice with Guichen in the West Indies.

;

After being driven back into port, by a ftorm which threw them into the greatest disorder, and which rendered their condition ftill worse, the French took their final departure from Cadiz, on the 7th of November. What would in other times and circumftances have been fatal, now produced no effect; this was no less than their falling in, after the feparation of the Spanish fleet, with Admiral Darby. But his force amounted

only

only to twenty-two fail of the line, and two fifties. This great fuperiority, as we could not be quite certain of the ill condition of the enemy, muft neceffarily have checked all well-governed adventure. It has, however, been thought (and the opinion received a confiderable fanction, from what was held out by the firft lord of the admiralty upon the fubject in parliament), that their condition, in every refpect confidered, encumbered and divided as they were by their convoy, an attack would, in all human probability, have been attended with the most decifive confequences. It was reported, that the hoftile fleets were for fome days fo near each other, that it was a matter of fome care and nicety to prevent their being entangled in the dark, an event, the confequences of which, both fides were equally ftudious to

avoid.

In the course of this year, an extraordinary number of wellfought and defperate actions took place, both in the old and the new world, between the British and French frigates; in which, though the former had conftantly the advantage when upon equal terms, and that the latter were frequently taken; yet there were fuch inftances of profeffional skill, courage, and dexterity, continually displayed on the part of the enemy, as were before unknown in the French marine. It is probable, that no naval hiftory of any age, could, in an equal space of time, afford fo many inftances of fingle combat between ship and fhip, in which the points of profeffional and national honour were fo nobly fuftained, and fuch nu

merous acts of bravery performed on both fides. It is with fingular pleafure, and no fmall pride, we likewife record, that in these hard and bloody trials of virtue, the humanity, liberality, and generofity of the British officers, rofe in proportion to the gallantry of their vanquished enemies, and far exceeded all examples of past times. Indeed, the generous regret exprefled for those who had bravely fallen, the kind attention paid to thofe who furvived, and the public acknowledgements

made of the valour of both, rather excited images of what we imagine might have paffed in the gallant contention of heroes at a tourna ment, than of the ufual ferocity and cruelty of war.

The fiege of Gibraltar ftill con⚫ tinued. The blockade on the land fide commenced in the month of July 1779; and the place was foon after invested as closely by fea, as the nature of the gut, and the variety of the wind and wea ther, would permit. The Spaniards likewife laboured inceffantly in the conftruction of works, as well for the cover and fecurity of their camp at St. Rocque, as for the furtherance of their future intended operations. All the capital efforts of the Spanish nation feemed to be directed towards that object; and fortunately it happened for this kingdom they were fo directed.

We have seen in our laft volume, the fignal fuccefs which attended Sir George Rodney, in his voyage to adminifter fupplies to that garrifon; a fervice which he effectually performed. From that time the vigilance and industry of the Spaniards, in their endeavours

to

to cut off all relief by fea, was reoubled; and the difficulty of fupplying the garrison was continually increafing. In the mean time, the prefence of the Panther and Experiment thips of war, and of a royal floop, which lay in the bay, was a grievous eyefore to the enemy; and greatly checked the ardour of their enterprize, in attemping to cut off, on their nearer approach, thofe veffels, which had the fortune to elude their more diftant vigilance.

A fcheme was accordingly laid by the Spanish commanders, for burning this little fquadron, with fome ordnance tranfports which lay under their protection. The defign was not ill formed. A very dark night, between the 6th and 7th of June, was fixed upon for the execution of the project. Seven fire-fhips were excellently prepared for the purpose. These were fupported by a crowd of rowboats and gallies, filled with men, and with every kind of offenfive arms At a greater distance, a fquadron of fhips of war, under the Admiral Don Barcello, stood off and on at the entrance of the bay; not only to cover and emboiden the attack, but to intercept any veffels which migh attempt to efcape. The wind and weather were highly favourable, and the darkness of the night feemed to infure fuccefs.

The British commanders had not the fmalleft notice of their danger, until they were alarmed at one in the morning, by the approaching flames of the burning fire-fhips. Without furprize or confternation at fo dangerous an appearance, they, with the most immediate prefence of mind, in

ftantly manned all their boats; and the officers and feamen with their ufual intrepidity, met, and grappled the fire-fhips; and then, amidft the bursting of fhells. and all the horrors of a scene which teemed with inftant deftruction, boldly towed them off, and run them on different parts of the fhore. They had fcarcely got clear of this first fet of fire-fhips, when two large veffels were perceived bearing down directly on the Panther; but they were received with fo fierce a cannonade, that they were foon set on fire, and difpofed of like the former.

During the whole time, a heavy fire from the ships and the town batteries was kept up against the gallies and boats; but the darkness prevented any certain knowledge of the effect. By the remains of one of thofe veffels, which were examined in the morning, the appeared to have been about the fize of a fifty-gun fhip; and from the quantity of unconfumed materials and combuftibles which were found in that and others, it was evident, that much labour and expence were bestowed upon their fitting out and equipment. Too much praife cannot be bestowed on the conduct of the Captains Harvey, of the Panther, Leflie, of the Enterprize, and Faulkner, of the St. Firmin. The matters and crews of the transports (as upon all other occafions of the prefent war, where the opportunity offered) behaved admirably. The und unted intrepidity difplayed by the officers and men in the boats, can only be equalled, but can never be exceeded, even by British feamen.

The town and fhips had the fatisfac

tisfaction of beholding at break of day Don Barcello's baffled fquadron going back into Algefiraz. It should furely be an incentive to refolution and bold enterprize to learn, that not a fingle man was loft on the British fide, in an affair which carried fo dreadful an appearance. It is evident, that the Spaniards, at leaft in the feven first fire-fhips, wanted refolution and firmness to bring their veffels near enough, before they fet them on fire. Upon the whole, it will probably be found, that, excepting fome very peculiar fituation, or a conflict with fome contemptible enemy, it will require all the profeffional boldness and dexterity, and all the natural fortitude of British feamen, to manage firefhips in fuch a manner, as will render them productive of any great advantage. The fortune of the Ruffians at Chifme, in the late war, will hardly be found an exception.

Though the Spaniards laboured hard in puking on their works towards the fortrefs, they had frearently he mortification of feeing, when they were nearly compleated, the fruits of much time and labour defiroyed in a few hours by the weight of fire from the batteries. Indeed it feemed to be nearly a ftanding maxim with Gen. Elliot, to let them proceed without interruption to the point we have mentioned, and then at once to throw all their hopes to the ground. Some judicious and fuccefsful fallies, were likewife occafionally, though fparingly, made by the garrifon; in one of which, they brought three pieces of cannon into the fortrefs, from a work

which they had taken with fome flaughter of the enemy.

Time, the leisure of a long blockade, with the conftant contemplation of fo near an object, and the vexation of being baffled by a handful of men, who seemed almoft to be abandoned to their own fortune, at length whetted the invention of the Spaniards to a project, which foon afforded much trouble to the garrifon; and in its process, produced the utter deftruction of the town, the ruin of the unfortunate inhabitants, and infinitely increased the difficulties and dangers of the defence. This was the framing a number of gunboats, of a conftruction calculated to carry very heavy cannon and mortars, for the purpose of caunonading and bombarding the town and works in the night; whilft their own lownefs, with the difficulty of perceiving, as well as of hitting the object, preferved them, in a very great degree, from the fire of the batteries. The total want of a naval force gave effect to this measure, by disabling the garrifon from encountering the enemy in their own way. But its being a work of labour, time, and experiment, prevented the effect of these floating batteries from being, until the following year, fully experienced.

While all the reft of Europe were entering into a confederacy, calculated for the fubverfion of the British naval power, the Queen of Portugal alone, had virtue to perfevere in her friendship, and refused to accede to the armed neutrality. This refufal was the more generous and exemplary, as it was in effect rendering herself liable to